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RECENT CASES
Antitrust Law-Violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act by Joint Venture
On February 25, 1960, Penn-Olin Chemical Company was jointly
formed by Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation and Pennsalt
Chemicals Corporation, each owning fifty percent of the stock. Its
purpose was to produce and sell sodium chlorate, a chemical widely
used in the manufacture of pulp and paper, in the southeastern United
States market. Prior to the formation of the joint venture, both
companies were studying the feasibility of independent, as well as
joint, entry into that market. Their studies indicated that the market,
which in 1960 was divided among three firms,' was ripe for the entry
of a new production facility within its geographical confines. The
government sought to dissolve the joint venture under section 1 of
the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act2 on the grounds
that the market was being deprived of potential competition. The
district court dismissed the complaint, finding no evidence that both
companies would have entered the market simultaneously.3 It refused
to consider whether competition would have been "substantially
lessened" had one parent firm entered the market while the other
remained only a potential competitor. On appeal 4 to the United
States Supreme Court, held, vacated and remanded for a re-evaluation
of the anti-competitive probabilities of the latter situation. If a joint
venture's parent firms are both motivated and able to enter a new
market independently, the impact upon the industry's competitive
atmosphere resulting from the loss of potential entrants must be
1. Hooker Chemical Corporation, 49.5 per cent; American Potash & Chemical
Corporation, 41.6 per cent; and Pennsalt, 8.9 per cent supplied from temporary excess
capacity in its Oregon plant.
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States . . . is declared to be illegal." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1955).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also
in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).
3. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
4. Generally, where the United States is a complainant in antitrust actions, appeal
from the final judgment of a district court lies only to the United States Supreme Court,
32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1948).
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assessed to determine whether there is a substantial lessening of
competition. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964).
The Supreme Court here for the first time applies section 7 to a

domestic joint venture 5 formed by corporations not already competing within the market. Technically, section 7 prohibits the acquisition of a corporation "engaged in commerce," not one intending to
become so engaged. 6 However, courts interpreting legislative intent7
to give short shrift to such technical arguments, have refused, in
view of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment,8 to create another loophole.
The real question is not how a joint subsidiary is acquired, but how
it affects competition within the industry. 9 Under section 7 an
amalgamation is illegal if its probable effect 0 is "substantially to
lessen competition." To determine anti-competitive effect, analysis
of the resultant market structure should include evaluation of the
number and size of sellers, the conditions of entry, the rate of growth
of the industry, industry pricing policies; and, in the case of a joint
venture, the reasons for its creation, its relations to its parents, and
the ability of its parents to enter the industry alone." A particularly
important question is whether the joint venture forecloses potential
competition, either between its parents 2 or between itself and other
5. The term "joint venture" will be used only to denote joint participation in the

creation of a new producing organization.
6. But in Aluminum Company of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922),
cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923), where two corporations contrived a transfer of
assets of one to a newly formed subsidiary, the court held the subsidiary to be engaged
in commerce while the assets were being transferred at its inception, before its
operations commenced.
7. "Congress contemplated that the 1950 amendment would . . . bring the entire
range of corporate amalgamations . . . within the scope of § 7." United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963). Judicial disdain for the technical
argument is illustrated by United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153,
181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). For the legislative background see H.R. REP'. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
8. Many economists have argued that Congress' failure to include asset sales under
the original section 7, which only applied to combinations effected by stock sales,
was a loophole in its anti-competitive design. The Celler-Kefauver Amendment
brought asset acquisitions within the scope of section 7.
9. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), requires
that the economic effects of an acquisition be measured at the time of suit rather
than at the time of acquisition, thus further nullifying the technical "engaged in
commerce" argument.
10. A mere possibility of lessened competition is not enough. There must be a
reasonable probability that the anti-competitive effect will occur before the acquisition
will be condemned. Id. at 598.
11. See KAYSEN & TuRNER, ANTrrRUsT POLICY 136-41 (1959); U.S. DEPT. OF
JusTicE, ATT'Y Gmx. NAT'L Comm. ANTrrusT REP. 32-36 (1955); Hale, Joint
Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and the Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REv. 927, 937
(1956); Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 712, 732-33 (1962).
12. As in the Penn-Olin case.
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firms within the industry. 13 In another context, an amalgamation
eliminating a highly significant potential competitor has been condemned, 14 for, as one observer has put it, "potential competition ...
may restrain producers from overcharging those to whom they sell
or underpaying those from whom they buy."'5
In the principal case the Court, in view of the legislative history
of section 7, struck aside the technical question of whether the firm
acquired was "engaged in commerce" and went on to consider the
anti-competitive effect of the acquisition. The lower court had ruled
that section 7 would not apply to Penn-Olin unless it could be shown
as a matter of probability that both joint venturers would have
entered the market. The Supreme Court, in remanding, added another area of applicability of section 7's "lessening of competition":
the possibility of foreclosure of competition when only one firm enters
while the other remains a significant potential competitor at the edge
of the market. This question the lower court had deliberately refrained from deciding. But the Supreme Court, pointing to factors"0
that might have motivated at least one or possibly both of the joint
venturers to enter singly if joint entry were prohibited, concluded
that a prima facie case had been stated under section 7, since entry
was financially and technologically possible for each. The area of
probabilities relating to potential competition must be assessed, the
Court stated, even though precise competitive effects cannot be
measured.
Dismissing the applicability of the Sherman Act to this set of facts
without additional comment, 7 the Court required only an evaluation
of incipient anti-competitive probabilities. By thus emphasizing incipiencies, the Court comes to the essential difficulty inherent in the
problem of joint ventures. When competition is foreclosed by merger,
the foreclosure is present and obvious-one merged firm now exists
where there had been two competitors. On the other hand, foreclosure by a joint venture entering a new market is purely prospective,
13. The test is whether an acquisition resulting in vertical integration would "unreasonably restrict the opportunities of competitor producers . . . to market their
product." United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948).
14. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), where an
established firm, seeking to protect its market share, acquired a potential competitor.
15. WILCOX, CoMPmranoN AND MONOPOLY iN AmERICAN INDUSTRY 7 (TNEC
Monograph No. 21, 1940).
16. Among these were an expanding market; both parents being "identified" with
the industry, i.e., one was a producer in another geographical market while the other,
through patent ownership, had extensive selling contacts in the market; and both
having long been interested in entering the market. United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174-75 (1964).
17. Id. at 161. Implicit in this summary dismissal of the Sherman Act's applicability
is the recognition of its more restrictive scope. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962).
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while at the same time competition within the present market is
actually being stimulated by the presence of the new firm. Compare
the competitive effect of the joint venture to that of the other entry
possibilities absent the joint venture: no entry with both joint
venturer firms remaining only potential competitors (neither immediately willing to take the risk alone); one entry with no potential
competitor (the other firm being discouraged by the entry of the
first and thus dropping its own entry plans); one entry with one
remaining significant potential competitor; and two entries. The first
two possibilities give a less competitive result than the joint venture
entry, while the latter two, in the absence of significant time lags,
give a more competitive result. Furthermore, one presently effective
entrant can greatly jar a complacent, tightly oligopolistic market as,
indeed, this joint venture did. 18 Entry time-lags in the absence of the
collaborative action should also be considered.
In any event, by collusive action, competition between the actors
is definitely precluded. This is the danger with which the court is
concerned: 19 whether it is reasonably probable that the two might
have been competitors, potential or actual. In view of the demonstrable, present enhancement of competition caused by the presence of a
new firm, a strong probability of foreclosure of competition should be
demonstrated because of the uncertainties in the evaluation of prospective foreclosure of competition. It is in this area that the Court is
perhaps over-enthusiastic in seeking to arrest incipient anti-competitive tendencies. Any firm entering the sodium chlorate industry that
achieves competitive economies of scale will necessarily obtain a significant market share.20 Consequently, in the absence of explosive
market demand, entrants will be few, since a prospective entrant will
not be attracted by a market where recent entry has created excess
capacity. Other potential competitors were present, one having since
entered,21 with resultant dampening effect on the desirability of entry
to any one of the others. The joint venture, though obtaining a significant market share due to scale requirements, did not attain a ma18. Id. at 174.
19. No doubt, much recent comment about the joint venture serving business as a
collusive device whereby competition can be eliminated before it is begun, coupled
with increasing use of the form by large corporations, also concerns the Court. See,
for example, Dixon, Joint Ventures: What is their Impact on Competition?, 7 ANmTusT BuLL. 397 (1962).
20. Apparently the minimum optimal scale is approximately 15,000 tons capacity
per annum, as indicated by the smallest plant in the market. This size is about onesixth of 1962 capacity in the Southeast. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,
supranote 16, at 164-65.
21. Pittsburg Plate Glass Company built a plant in the market after Penn-Olin. Id.
at 165.
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jority share of the market. 22 Opportunities for entry had been known
to both firms for years, yet neither had entered, perhaps because of
anticipated risks or anticipated marginal profitability.P The joint ar-

rangement succeeded in crystallizing entry into an industry where it
was sorely needed.24 These factors, unemphasized by the Court, tend
to make the illegality of Penn-Olin highly questionable. Nevertheless,
it is important that elimination of potential competition be considered
in joint venture situations. For that reason the precise holding itself

is to be approved, although the Court should have also stressed the
actual, present enhancement of competition as a factor to be balanced
against the uncertainties inherent in the evaluation of anti-competitive
probabilities.

Civil Rights-Anti-discrimination Law as a
Vehicle for a Private Civil Action
Plaintiff, a member of the Jewish faith, submitted his application
for the purchase of an apartment in defendant corporation's cooperative apartment building. Approximately three months later,
the plaintiff's application was rejected at a meeting of defendant's

board of directors.' Plaintiff then filed suit against the defendant,
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.2 In his complaint,
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's failure to approve the appli-

cation was motivated by religious discrimination, contrary to public
policy as expressed in the New York City anti-discrimination law,3
22. Its precise share was 27.6 per cent. Ibid.
23. See the district court's opinion, supra note 3, at 128-30.
24. For the duopoly background of the industry see id. at 115-18.
1. The by-laws of defendant corporation required that its board of directors consent to the sale of each apartment. To this end plaintiff had submitted his social,
business, and credit references to the board of directors for their consideration.
Bachrach v. 1001 Tenant's Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 512, 514, 245 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
2. Plaintiff claimed he incurred $70,000 compensatory damages since he had to
buy another apartment at a higher cost and also claimed $250,000 punitive damages.
Id. at 514, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
3. "In the City of New York, with its great cosmopolitan population consisting of
large numbers of people of every race, color, creed, national origin and ancestry,
there is no greater danger to the health, morals, safety and welfare of the city, and
its inhabitants than the existence of groups prejudiced against one another and
antagonistic to each other because of differences of race, color, creed, national origin
or ancestry." NEw Yonx Crry ADminsTRATrVE CODE § BI-1.0. The court then
quoted another section of the code: "Section X41-1.0 of the code, with an exception
not relevant here, prohibits an 'owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee . . . or managing
agent of, or other person having the right to sell, rent, [or] lease, a housing accommodation which is located in a multiple dwelling' from denying these accommo-
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and that such action was intended to injure the plaintiff. The defendant moved that the complaint be dismissed since it failed to
state a cause of action.4 Held, motion denied. Where an anti-discrimination law does not expressly provide an exclusive remedy, it
may serve as the basis for a private civil action. Bachrach v. 1001
Tenants Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 512, 245 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
By allowing a private civil action to be based upon the violation
of a legislative enactment, the courts accomplish a two-fold purpose:
the injured plaintiff is provided with relief where he would ordinarily have none, and an additional deterrent is provided. In Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,5 Negro passengers
enroute from California to Australia were not allowed to reboard
their plane after a stopover in Hawaii. Such conduct was prohibited
by the Civil Aeronautics Act,6 which afforded criminal penalties and
injunctive relief.7 However, the act contained no provision under
which the injured plaintiff might recover damages. The court there
said that the statute was intended to protect the class of individuals
of which plaintiff was a member, and held that "consequently, by
implication, its violation creates an actionable civil right for the
vindication of which a civil action may be maintained by any such
person who has been harmed by the violation." 8 In reaching its
decision the court in Fitzgerald9 recognized that even though the
criminal penalties and injunctive relief provided in the act might
deter such conduct by the defendant in the future, the dominant
purpose of the act could not be realized unless the injured plaintiff
was allowed to seek relief. 10 Other cases have refused a private
cause of action where the statute contained sanctions sufficient to
insure compliance 1 or where its allowance would too greatly. broaden
the impact of the statute. 2 When allowing a civil remedy some
dations to any person because of his 'race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry;'

and directs that he may not discriminate against or segregate any person on these
grounds." Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp., supra note 1, at 515, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
4. Defendant based his motion on N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 3211 (a)7.
5. 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
6. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 404(b), 52 Stat. 993.
7. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1015; Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1002(c), 52 Stat. 1018.
8. 229 F.2d at 501.
9. Supra note 5.
10. Id. at 502.
11. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co. 341 U.S.
246 (1951); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d
543 (9th Cir. 1954); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 215 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
12. Vance v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.M. 1956).
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courts 1 3 have relied on section 286 of the Restatement of Torts.14

However, this section pertains only to the establishment of a standard
of conduct in negligence cases and not to the creation of a private
civil action.'5 In Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 6 the court used
the fiction of "presumed" legislative intent to create a civil remedy.
Those who argue against this theory contend that had the legislature intended to provide the plaintiff with a private cause of action,
it would have expressed it in the statute. 7 Before any legislative
enactment can be used as the basis for civil relief, the statute itself
must not exceed the constitutional authority of the legislative body.
In Tynes v. Gogos,18 a municipal ordinance was not allowed to serve
as the basis for a civil remedy because the city lacked the power
to enact the particular type of ordinance involved. In general, ,cases
which allow a private civil action have involved penal statutes."
The court, in Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,20 held that an
executive order forbidding discrimination in employment by federal
contractors would not support a civil right of action since such conduct had not been declared criminal.
In the instant case the court did not discuss whether the statute
involved could be used as the basis for the plaintiff's action but
rather held that the plaintiff had sufficiently stated a cause of action
in "prima facie tort."2 ' The court said that "'[tihe key to the prima
facie tort is the infliction of intentional harm, resulting in damage,
without excuse or justification, by an act or a series of acts which
would otherwise be lawful.'"22 Here the defendant could lawfully
refuse to lease an apartment to the plaintiff, but, if the refusal was
based upon "illegal or ulterior reasons, ' the injured plaintiff could
seek damages. After finding that the plaintiff's complaint stated a
cause of action, the court then considered whether the New York
13. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Osborne v.
Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81
F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
14. "Violations creating Civil Liability. The violation of a legislative enactment
by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable
for an invasion of an interest of another .... ." RESTATmENT, ToRTs § 286 (1934).
15. This view has now been made clear in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), ToRTs § 286 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1958).
16. 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
17. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv.
361, 364 (1932).
18. 144 A.2d 412 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958).
19. See PRossEr, ToRTs § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
20. 215 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
21. 41 Misc. 2d 515, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
22. Id. at 515, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 915, quoting Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769,
146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1955).
23. Ibid.
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City anti-discrimination ordinance2 provided an exclusive remedy.
The court noted that, while a similar state statute25 limited remedies
for its breach only to those expressly provided within the statute,
the subsequently enacted city ordinance contained no similar limitation. 6 Applying a traditional method of statutory interpretation,
was intentional and a
the court concluded that such an "omission
27
implied."
be
therefore
not
may
limitation
The perplexity of the courts over whether a particular statute
may be used as the basis for civil relief could, of course, be avoided
by careful draftsmanship, specifying in the statutes themselves
whether such relief is to be granted. Lacking this it seems reasonable
that a member of a class for whose protection the legislature has
enacted a statute should be allowed to seek relief in a civil action
for injuries arising from violation of the statute. True, the statute may
be sufficiently enforced by the criminal penalties and injunctive relief
provided, but too often these sanctions are of little help to an injured
plaintiff. 28 This is particularly true in cases involving a violation of
a civil rights statute, since the injured plaintiff probably will not be
able to seek relief at common law. Furthermore, it does not seem
reasonable to restrict the allowance of a civil action to those statutes
which are penal in nature. The fact that the legislature has declared
certain conduct detrimental to the public welfare is itself sufficient
reason to grant a civil action.29 In retrospect, one feels that the court
in Fitzgerald3 would have allowed the plaintiffs action even had
the statute contained no criminal penalty. Justice Frankfurter gave
support to this view when he stated that, "if civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied
this traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized."31
Courts today are becoming more sensitive to the problems of victims
24. See note 3 supra.
25. N.Y. Cry. PBosrrs L_-w § 18(a). The constitutionality of this statute has been
upheld in New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
26. 41 Misc. 2d at 517, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 917. The enforcement of the city ordinance
is accomplished by having the plaintiff present his complaint before a city commissioner. If the commission believes there has been discrimination, it attempts to conciliate the matter. If this method fails, the matter is referred to the city attorney who
then seeks an injunction against the offender.
27. Ibid.
28. See Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
29. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HAtvAIw LEGAL EssAYs 213, 220
(1934).
30. 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
31. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261
(1951) (dissenting opinion).
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of discrimination. As a result, courts will undoubtedly base their
decision on whether to allow a private civil action on the merits of
the individual case and on the capacity of the particular antidiscrimination statute to permit an interpretation that allows such
an action.

Condemnation-Landowner Cannot Recover
From Federal Government for Damages Caused
Before Date of Taking Where Government Did
Not Previously Contemplate, Condemning Property
The United States Government sued to condemn 3,276.21 acres of
land adjacent to a military airfield' and was awarded a fee simple in
July, 1958. Since at least 1952 the land had been under the flight
pattern of government planes as they took off and landed; however,
the court in a non-jury proceeding fixed the date of valuation as
August, 1955, when the interference from the flights became severe
enough to constitute a taking.2 On the issue of valuation, the government contended that the land should be valued by taking into account
flights over the land prior to August, 1955, which flights had already
depreciated the value of the land. The landowners contended that
the government should be liable for the full value of the land as if
the property had not been depreciated by the flights prior to the date3
of taking. After asking the jury to return alternate valuation verdicts,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
held, in a condemnation proceeding under the federal constitution
where the government did not contemplate taking the land in question
at the time the project was initiated, the landowners may not recover
for damage caused by the government before the date of taking.
1. An earlier decision had settled the issue as to the ownership of the property.
United States v. 3,276.21 Acres of Land, 194 F. Supp. 297 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
2. The government in the instant case is taking a fee simple. The government
claimed that it already had an aviational easement over the land because there had
been an incipient easement beginning in 1952 and that the easement had been
acquired after six years by adverse possession. Thus, the government claimed it
should pay the value of the fee simple less the value of the easement. However, the
court found that there had not been an incipient taking until August, 1955, when
jet flights first became frequent. See Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain:
Irreverence for Unconstitutional Practice, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 319 (1963); Harvey,
Landowners" Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56 Mica. L. .nv. 1313
(1958). See note 6 infra.
3. The court asked for alternate verdicts so that if, on appeal, it was held that
the court picked the wrong measure of damages, it would not be necessary to have a
new trial. The verdict ignoring the overflights was $3,250,000. The verdict considering
the overflights was $3,075,000.
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United States v. 3,276.21 Acres of Land (Miramar), 222 F. Supp. 887
(S.D. Cal. 1963).
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides
4
that private property cannot be taken without just compensation.
The constitutions in many states require payment of compensation
when private property is either taken or damaged for public use.5
The United States Supreme Court has held that there may be a taking
of a permanent easement for the purpose of the fifth amendment
where government planes fly over private land so low and so frequently as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. 6 There can never be a taking, however,
unless the planes fly directly over the property; that is, there must
be a direct physical invasion of the airspace over the property. 7 The
market value of the interest taken for public use has been the general
standard for measuring compensation to the owner.8 In determining
the market value of the interest taken, it is necessary to decide
whether or not any change in the value of the land has been caused
by government activity in the area before the date of valuation. If
there has been such a change in value, it is then necessary to determine if it is to be considered in making the condemnation award. 9
Where there is an increase in value as a result of government activity
before the date of taking, such as buying nearby land, and where the
land in question is probably within the area to be condemned, this
increase in value is excluded in arriving at the value of the property
being condemned. 10 The converse of this is that the court must
exclude any depreciation in value caused by government activity once
the government is committed to the project." Prior to the case at
hand, there apparently had been no decision directly in point as to
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation ... "
5. 2 NICHOLS, EzmNrT DommN § 6.1[3] (4th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
NICHOLS].

6. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See Dugan, The Causby Doctrine
-Medieval Concept of the Jet-Age, 2 WAsntumn L.J. 272 (1963). Since the government in the instant case is actually taking a fee simple, the amount of recovery includes the amount that would have been awarded if the government had only taken
an easement.
7. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955, rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963), 16 VAND. L. REv. 430 (1963).
8. 4 NicnoLs § 12.1[5].
9. McCoaMrcK, DAMAGES § 129 (1935); 4 NIcHoLs § 12.3151.
10. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369 (1943); 4 Nicous § 12.3151.
11. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961); 4 NICHOLS §
12.3151. "It would be manifestly unjust to permit a public authority to depreciate
property values by a threat to erect an offensive structure and then to take advantage
of this depression in the price which it must pay for the property." 1 ORcEL, VALUAnToN UNDEa E uNET DoMamN 447 (2d ed. 1953).

1512

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 17

whether or not the last stated rule should apply to facts similar to
these in the instant case. An earlier case held that there would be no
compensation for a loss caused by overhead flights before the date of
the taking.12 However, in that case the federal government had
bought a municipal airport shortly before the date of taking and the
court felt that most of the loss in the value of the property had
occurred before the purchase; thus, the government was not responsible for the loss. 13 There is support for defendant's contention in a
concurring opinion to a 1961 Court of Claims decision' 4 wherein it
was argued that the landowner should be entitled to an award greater
than the difference in value immediately before and after the advent
of the jets, the date of the taking, since the government activities
before the date of taking had lowered the value of the property.
However, the landowner had not claimed the damage so the issue
was not decided. 15
In the instant case the court rejected the measure of damages requested by the landowners. The court indicated that such a measure
of damages applies only where the government contemplated condemning the land when the project was initiated and that the present
case did not come within that rule.16 Although many state constitutions provide that property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation, the fifth amendment of the federal
constitution says only that property shall not be taken. 7 The court
said, "we think that incidental damage short of a taking, must be
damage which must be borne by the landowner in this type of
condemnation action and that if he has any remedy, it may be a
remedy in the court of claims." 8 The court indicated that the defendants made a plausible argument to the effect that the government
should not be permitted to depreciate property by trespass short of
taking, and then condemn the property and have it valued at a lesser
figure because of the trespass. 19 The court thought it was a close
question, therefore, the jury was instructed to return alternate valuation verdicts. However, the court held that the measure of damages
requested by the landowners was not applicable to this case.
The court justifies its measure of damages by saying that if there
is any recovery for the damage caused prior to the taking, it would
12. Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
13. Ibid. There was also a serious question whether or not there had been any
loss in value to the land by overflights before the taking.
14. Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
15. Id. at 936.
16. 222 F. Supp. at 889.
17. See note 4 supra.
18. 222 F. Supp. at 890.
19. Id. at 892.
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be in the Court of Claims. However, the only possible cause of action
would be under the Federal Tort Claims Act20 for trespass or nuisance,
and it would seem unlikely that an adequate or indeed any recovery
would be possible.2 ' In denying recovery there is another argument
not mentioned by the court. In this mechanical age there are many
small annoyances that have to be tolerated without a legal remedy
such as the noise of passing trucks and trains. Likewise our society
must tolerate a certain amount of inconvenience from the noise of
airplanes. However, in a condemnation proceeding it would appear
that the landowner should be compensated for the depreciation of
his land caused by government action before the land is actually
condemned. It is reasonable that the government should not have
to pay profits to speculators who buy land in anticipation of the government later condemning the land. The converse of this rule should
apply to the instant case, that is-where government activity lessens
the value of land before it takes the land, the government should pay
for this loss of value. This should apply whether or not the government contemplated taking the land when the project was initiated.
Whenever the government, by virtue of interference caused by overflights, takes land near an airport, it is probably true that the government did not contemplate taking that land when the project was
started. This absence of an initial intent to condemn does not, however, change the fact that the landowner has incurred damages caused
by the government interference prior to the date of taking. For this
reason the test of contemplation should not be applicable to such
proceedings. The government is put in the position of being a wrongdoer profiting from its own wrong.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
21. Some of the problems in obtaining recovery under the Federal Tort Claims
Act are:
(a) In 1958 Congress extended the definition of navigable airspace to include
"airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing." See 72 Stat. 739 (1958),
49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958). Prior to the 1958 Act it had been suggested that there
is an implied statutory immunity from suits against the Government resulting from
flights in navigable airspace since such flights were legislatively authorized. See
Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Note, 74 HARv. L. Rv.
1581 (1961); 29 J. Am L. & CoM. 72 (1963). Thus it may be held that there is no
cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
(b) The limit of recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act is $10,000. 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1958).
(c) The tvo year statute of limitations would often bar recovery. 28 U.S.C. §
2401(b) (1958).
See generally: Abend, Federal Liability for Takings and Torts, 31 FoanDHAm L. REv.
481 (1963); Comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 259 (1958).
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Constitutional Law-Loss of Nationality-Foreign
Residency Statute Held Violative of Due Process
A German national who had acquired derivative American citizenship through her mother in 1950, subsequently married a German
national and returned to her land of birth in 1956. She was denied
a United States passport in 1959 by the State Department on the
ground that by residing in Germany for more than three years she
suffered automatic loss of citizenship under section 352(a) (1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.1 In accordance with the
procedural provisions of the Act, she sued in the district court for a
declaratory judgment that she was still an American citizen, at the
same time asking for, and ultimately being granted 2 a three judge
panel to contest the constitutionality of the section. This panel upheld
the constitutionality of section 352(a) (1) as a valid congressional
exercise of the foreign relations power. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, held, the statute providing for loss of citizenship of a naturalized citizen having continuous residence for three years in the country
of his birth constitutes discrimination so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
While the Constitution expressly gives Congress the power "to
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," 3 there is no such provision regarding expatriation. Yet the broad power over foreign
affairs, coupled with the necessary and proper clause, has afforded
a basis for congressional action.4 Another basis for such power is the
doctrine of the "inherent power of sovereignty." 5 Prior to the Nationality Act of 1907,6 Congress had repeatedly failed to enact necessary legislation in this area. The consequent statutory void forced
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 352(a)(1), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
1484(a)(1) (1958): "(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization
shall lose his nationality by-(i) having a continuous residence for three years in the
territory of a foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place
of his birth is situated, except as provided in section 1485 of this title, whether such
residence commenced before or after the effective date of this chapter."
2. The district court denied her motion to convene a three-judge court deciding
that she had raised no substantial constitutional issues. The action was affirmed by
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded her case for a
trial on the merits. Schneider v. Rusk, 372 U.S. 224 (1963).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1957); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,
311-12 (1915).
5. It has been held in external affairs that the United States, independent of the
Constitution, possesses all the powers of any sovereign. Expatriation has been included. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Mackenzie v. Hare, supra note 4, at 311.
6. Ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
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the State Department to rely on executive messages and other sources
to determine pertinent policy regarding expatriation.7 The State Department's desire to avoid further policy fragmentation led to efforts
to obtain positive law in the area. These efforts culminated in a twoyear provision comparable to that involved in the instant case, except
that there was a rebuttable presumption of loss of citizenship.8 In
implementation, the provision was made less drastic by many courts,
which treated the presumption as relating only to a loss of diplomatic
protection.9 In 1933, President Roosevelt appointed a committee to
codify existing statutes. For the sake of administrative convenience
and in order to avoid long and expensive litigation in the courts, the
committee recommended that loss of citizenship be automatic upon
determination of the necessary facts. 10 This approach was in agreement with the dictum in a recent Supreme Court opinion that "the
termination of citizenship terminates the problem."" An examination
of the history of section 352(a) (1) discloses a legislative purpose of
avoiding embarrassment to the United States that might arise from
the conduct of naturalized citizens while residing in their respective
fatherlands.12 In more recent decisions, the Court has held unconstitutional similar sections providing for loss of citizenship by those convicted of desertion from our armed forces in wartime' 3 and by those
who remain outside the jurisdiction of the United States in wartime for
the purpose of evading military service.1 4 In these cases the Court
was concerned with the penal nature of the sections as a violation
of the procedural guaranties of the fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments. In the instant case, however, as in Perez v. Brownell, the
Court was confronted with the question whether the statute met the
substantive due process requirement of the fifth amendment.
The Court's continued recognition of the sanctity of citizenship,
coupled with constitutional silence on the explicit power of expatria7. For a discussion see Roche, Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, 35 CORNELL L.Q.
120 (1949), and Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of
Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25 (1950).
8. Nationality Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1128.
9. This idea was first expressed by Attorney General Wickersham in 1910. 28
OPs. A-rT'Y GEN. 504, 510 (1910). It was followed in Stein v. Fleischmann Co., 237
Fed. 679, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
10. STAFF OF HousE Comm. ON INMUCRATION AND NATURALIZATION, 76TH CONG., IST
SEss., REPORT ON THE CODIFICATION OF NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNrrm STATES
69 (Comm. Print 1938).
11. Perez v. Brownell, supra note 4 at 60. (Majority opinion by J. Frankfurter).
12. For a historical background of expatriation see Boudin, Involuntary Loss of

American Nationality, 73 HAIv. L. Rv. 1510 (1960); GORDON, Loss of Citizenship by
Continuous Residence Abroad, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 451 (1953); and Roche, supra
note 7.
13. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
14. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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tion, has resulted in curtailment of congressional exercise of the
foreign affairs power in the name of substantive due process. While
recognizing the power of Congress to employ means reasonably calculated to avoid embarrassment to the United States abroad, Mr.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, was of the opinion that
section 352(a)(1) created a "second-class citizenship." He noted
that although the fifth amendment contained no equal protection
clause, it did forbid discrimination "so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process," 5 that the statute, by proceeding on the "impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a class are less reliable
and bear less allegiance," worked an unwarranted hardship on a
particular limited class; and that the non-affirmative act of residing
abroad could not be automatically construed as voluntary renunciation of citizenship without consideration of compelling business and
family reasons. Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Justices Harlan and
White in the dissent, followed a line of reasoning earlier employed in
the landmark decision of Mackenzie v. Hare.16 The dissenting Justices
reasoned that petitioner, Mrs. Schneider, by acting with statutory
notice of the consequences of her act, made a voluntary renunciation
of her citizenship. 7
Thus, in the instant case, the lines of judicial disagreement were
clearly drawn. The majority espoused a personal approach which
would require judicial determination on a case-by-case basis. The
gravamen of this approach is contained in an earlier concurring
opinion by Justice Douglas in Hirabayashiv. United States: "Loyalty
is a matter of mind and of heart not of race." 8 The dissent, adhering
to a non-absolutist notion of citizenship, was satisfied with the
present "institutional approach," which recognizes the need for congressional power to deal with problems on a group basis. 19 Though
Mr. Justice Douglas failed sufficiently to demonstrate why the statutory classification was unreasonable, his conclusion was consistent
with his position in upholding the Japanese curfew during World
War II-that "group" treatment should be limited to periods of national emergency when public necessity so requires.20 His dissent in
Perez and certain dicta in the present case seem to indicate that
Justice Douglas would require a clear and unequivocal statement of
renunciation before loss of citizenship could be invoked. Such a
15. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1953).
16. 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915).
17. 377 U.S. at 169.

18. 320 U.S. 81, 107 (1942).
19. The distinction between the institutional and personal approaches was noted
in Roche, The ExpatriationCases, 1963 Sup. CT.REv. 325, 342.
20. Hirabayasbi v. United States, supra note 18.
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position circumscribes congressional action to such a degree that
citizenship obtained through naturalization is almost as absolute as
that guaranteed the native-born by the fourteenth amendment. "The
power of Congress to . .. modify it, or cancel it does not exist."21
While there is still room for Congress to lay down procedural guidelines, "group" treatment with regard to expatriation seems limited
to the instance of an "urgent public necessity."
The marked absence of explicit reasoning to support the decision is
in contrast to the lucid dissent of Circuit Judge Fahy.2 Conceding
that a valid legislative purpose might be served by this section of the
act, and that international embarrassment resulting from prolonged
residency abroad might be more prevalent among naturalized citizens,
Judge Fahy felt it unreasonable to issue a blanket indictment against
all naturalized citizens while granting a blanket immunity to all
native-born who are not within the purview of the statute but who
are a source of embarrassment abroad. "A reasonable classification for
some purposes does not justify the law in imposing an inequality
among citizens out of proportion to the purpose for which the classification was made."23
Recent Supreme Court decisions involving the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 demonstrate the Court's increasing determination to place American citizenship status in a highly preferred position.24 Any statutory or administrative abridgement of such citizenship, whether acquired at birth or by means of naturalization, has
been received critically, given narrow scope, and accorded a heavy
burden of proving its reasonableness. While a divided Court, in
Perez v. Brawnell, 5 upheld the constitutionality of another section
of the act providing for loss of nationality by voting in a foreign
political election, it is questionable whether that decision may be
distinguished from the present one. It may be argued that Perez
can be distinguished on the following points: the affirmative act of
voting is in contrast to the neutral act of residency abroad due to
compelling business or family reasons; voting in political elections
applies to both naturalized and native-born citizens, thereby creating
21. Perez v. Brownell, supra note 4, at 84. This absolutist approach to citizenship
stems from dicta by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824): "The simple power of the national Legislature is
to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts
it, so far as respects the individual." Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas reasons from the
premise that the naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native-born,
excepting constitutional eligibility for the Presidency.
22. 218 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1963).
23. Id. at 322.
24. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra note 14; Trop v. Dulles, supra note 13;
and Perez v. Brownell, supranote 4.
25. Supra note 4.
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no "second-class citizenship"; and the statutory phrase "political election" has been left open to definition, thereby providing for a caseby-case determination to some degree. The fact remains, however,
that the legislative approach of group treatment is present in both
sections. 26 Regardless of the course the Supreme Court may follow
with regard to voting in a foreign political election, the present
decision will be dispositive of the five-year residency provision contained in section 352(a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952.27 These recent decisions by the Court have made one thing
apparent: "Congressional exercise of the power to expatriate may be
subject to a further constitutional restriction-a limitation upon the
kind of activity which may be made the basis of denationalization."28
Certain avenues appear to remain open to Congress in the regulation
of expatriation procedure: a rebuttable presumption of loss of citizenship, suspension of citizenship until return to the United States, and
loss of diplomatic protection. Such legislation would quite likely have
to apply to all American citizens, both native-born and naturalized. 0
In light of changing currents in foreign affairs, a sound approach to
the problem of embarrassment caused by the prolonged residency of
American citizens abroad would be to avoid legislative action and
to rely upon the use of treaties and executive orders. Such an approach would mark a return to the pre-statutory expatriation measures
of the early twentieth century.30 This would enable the United
States to meet expatriation problems on a more individualized basis,
thus avoiding the Court's objections to group treatment.
26. In some countries it is possible for an American citizen to vote in national political elections without renouncing allegiance to the United States. Thus, it is difficult
to see how embarassment abroad or a dilution of allegiance would be the necessary
result in every instance.

Perez v. Brownell, supra note 4, at 77

(Warren, C.J.,

dissenting).
27. 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(2) (1958): "(a) A person who hs
become a national by naturalization sball lose his nationality by . . . (2) having a
continuous residence for five years in any foreign state or states, except as provided
in sections 1485 and 1486 of this title, whether such residence commenced before or
after the effective date of this chapter."
28. Stewart, J., in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra note 14.
29. While classification of citizens, if reasonable, could be upheld as a valid
congressional exercise of the foreign affairs power, the present case imposes an
almost insurmountable burden of demonstrating a valid legislative objective.
30. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-Both Houses
of a State Legislature Must Be Based as
Nearly as Is Practicable on Population
Plaintiffs, residents, taxpayers, and voters of Jefferson County,
Alabama, filed a complaint in the district court challenging the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature. The existing apportionment was
based upon the 1900 federal census, despite the requirement of the
state constitution that the legislature be reapportioned decenially. 1
Plaintiffs asserted that, since the population growth in the state had
been uneven, 2 Jefferson and other counties were now victims of
serious discrimination which deprived them of their rights under the
Alabama Constitution and under the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. Defendants, sued in their representative
capacities, were various state and political party officials charged
with the performance of certain duties in connection with state elections. A three judge federal district court ruled that the existing
system of apportionment and the two legislatively proposed plans
for the apportionment of seats in the two houses of the Alabama
Legislature were invalid under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and ordered into effect a temporary apportionment plan. 3 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, held, affirmed. The existing system of apportionment and the
two legislatively proposed plans for apportionment are invalid under
the equal protection clause, which requires that each house of a state
legislature be composed of districts as nearly of equal population as is
practicable.4 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
When the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Baker v. Carr,5 overruling a long line of decisions holding that the
Court would not attempt to adjudicate political questions in the
areas of legislative apportionment and dilution of individual voting
power by state laws, 6 public attention suddenly focused on the
1. ALA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 198-200 (1901).

2. See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 447 (1962).
3. Sims v. Frink, supra note 2.
4. This is one of a group of six apportionment cases. The other cases which
explain and clarify some of the points discussed in this case are Davis v. Mann, 377

U.S. 678 (1964); Lucas v. General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland Comm'n

for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S.

695 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. See Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S.

916 (1958); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S.
920 (1956); Remmy v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S.
804 (1947). But see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), where the court
did intervene in a state electoral process where there had been stuffing of ballot boxes.
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apportionment of state legislatures. 7 With the decision in Baker 8 the
Court entered the "political thicket[s]" 9 of apportionment of legislative representation and voter equality; but it laid down no guide
lines for the states or the courts to follow in determining what apportionment schemes would satisfy constitutional requirements. Subsequently, in Gray v. Sanders10 the Court struck down Georgia's
county unit method of electing its governor. In an opinion by Mr.
justice Douglas, expressing the views of eight of the justices," the
Court held that under the equal protection clause every voter is
entitled to a vote equal in weight to the vote of every other voter
in a statewide primary. The Court rejected any analogy between the
Georgia unit system and the electoral college, 2 but explicitly refused
to express an opinion as to whether bicameral state legislatures could
ignore population in the apportionment of one house.' 3 In Wesberry
v. Sanders,14 the Court once again discussed the issue spotlighted in
Baker.15 Basing its decision on article I, section 2 of the Constitution,16 the Court held that congressional districts must be drawn so
as to be approximately equal in population. By resting its decision
upon article I, section 2, the Court did not establish precedent for
state legislative apportionment cases, which must rest upon the equal
protection clause; but the tenor of the Wesbeiry opinion and its
complete disregard for nonpopulation factors left little doubt that it
stood for the principle of voter equality.
The reasoning of the Court in Reynolds, and the five companion
cases, is consistent with the reasoning of the recent cases discussed
above. The Court could find no cases that were directly controlling
on the question, but it did find that Gray17 and Wesberry 18 had
7. See BoYD, PATTERNS OF APPORTIONMENT (National Municipal League Pamphlet
1962); LARSON, REAPPORTIONMENT AND ThE COURTS, (1962);

McKAY, REAPPORTION-

MENT mN T=m FEDERAL ANALOGY (National Municipal League Pamphlet 1962).
8. Baker v. Carr,supra note 5.
9. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice

Frankfurter).
10. 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (8-1 decision).
11. Justice Harlan dissented expressing the view that the Court's "one person, one
vote" principle was constitutionally untenable.

12. 372 U.S. at 378-79.
13. Ibid.
14. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
15. Baker v. Carr, supra note 5.
16. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the
State Legislature." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. (Emphasis added.) The Court held that,
construed in its historical context, "by the People of the several States" means that as
nearly as is practicable there must be voter equality. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note
14, at 7-8.
17. Gray v. Sanders, supra note 10.
18. Wesberry v. Sanders, supranote 14.
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established certain principles that were relevant to the question under
consideration. 19 The Court's sweeping assertions in Gray,20 that the
equal protection clause requires that all who participate in an election
must have an equal vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex,
whatever their occupation, and wherever their home may be in that
geographical unit 2 l-established the basic principle of equality among
voters within a state.22 Although the decision in Wesberry23 neither
rests on the equal protection clause 24 nor involves the election of
state officials, 25 it clearly stands for the principle of "one man, one
vote" as the standard governing apportionment. 26 In considering the
contention that the apportionment of a state is analogous to the requirement of the United States Constitution that the Senate "shall be
composed of two Senators from each State"27 the Court found that
an examination of the history of our nation and of the Constitution
does not support this proposition.28 The Court does indicate, however, that some deviations from the equal population standard might
be permitted "[s]o long as the divergences... are based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy
."2
Among such considerations the Court does not include eco...
nomic or other sorts of group interests, geographical considerations,
or history; however, the Court does state that political subdivisions
might be an adequate basis for deviation provided that "population is
[not] submerged as the controlling consideration ....

."30

A careful

analysis of the opinion leads to the conclusion that what this means
is that a slight deviation might be allowed in order to recognize a
political subdivision, but that the guiding and controlling principle
must be equal population.
Upon the basic premise that the equal protection clause requires
both houses of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned on a
population basis, the Court struck down the apportionment plans of
19. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
20. Gray v. Sanders, supra note 10.
21. 372 U.S. at 379-80.
22. See 77 HAIIv. L. REv. 62, 133 (1963).
23. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra note 14.
24. Id. at 7-8.

25. Wesberry involves the state apportionment of Georgia's fifth congressional
district.
26. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 264 (1964). Contra, Reynolds v. Sims, supra note
19, at 589 (dissenting opinion).
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, superceded by amend. XVII.
28. 377 U.S. at 572-75. See also McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT AND THE FEDERAL
ANALOGY (1962); McKay, Federal Analogy and State Apportionment Standards, 38
NoTRE DA ME LAw. 487 (1963). Contra, Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962)
(dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter); Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 85, 104 N.W.2d
63, 107 (1960) (opinion of Justice Edwards).
29. 377 U.S. at 579.
30. Id. at 581.
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Alabama,3 1 Colorado,32 Delaware, 33 Maryland, 34 New York,S and Virginia. 36 Dissenting in the Colorado case, where the apportionment
plan was adopted by the people in a 1962 popular referendum as a
state constitutional amendment and in the New York case, Mr. Justice
Stewart argued that a state legislative apportionment scheme is constitutional if it is: (1) rational in light of the state's own characteristics and needs, and (2) not such as to permit the systematic
frustration of the majority's will.37 He accuses the Court of saying
"that the requirements of the equal protection clause can be met
in any state, only by the uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed
application of sixth-grade arithmetic."38 Mr. Justice Clark, who concurred in Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent, made some additional observations with reference to the Colorado case stating that the Colorado
apportionment should not be held invalid, particularly because of (1)
the public approval of this apportionment by referendum, (2) the
frequency of reapportionment in that state, (3) special geographic
and economic conditions in the state, and (4) the necessity of granting some latitude within the limits of rationality for the apportionment of the seats in one house, when the seats in the other house are
apportioned on a population basis.39 Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in
all of the cases on the ground that state legislative apportionments
should be wholly free of constitutional limitations, except the guarantee to each state of a republican form of government, which cannot
be the foundation for judicial relief.40 Although Reynolds was an
eight to one decision, on the issue of whether the apportionment
of both houses of a state legislature must be on an equal population
41
basis, the Court split six to three.
The decision in Reynolds may not be surprising to those who have
followed the Court's recent decisions in election and apportionment
31. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 19.
32. Lucas v. General Assembly, supra note 4.
33. Roman v. Sincock, supra note 4.
34. Maryland Comm'n for Fair Representation, supra note 4.
35. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, supra note 4. Here the Court said that the federal
district court may consider the imminency of the 1964 state elections in determining
whether to permit such elections under the existing unconstitutional apportionment
plan.
36. Davis v. Mann, supra note 4.
37. The dissent in the Colorado case is also for the New York case. Lucas v.
General Assembly, supra note 4 (dissenting opinion).
38. Lucas v. General Assembly, supra note 4, at 750 (dissenting opinion).
39. Id. at 741 (dissenting opinion).
40. Reynolds v. Sims, supranote 4, at 589 (dissenting opinion).
41. Those in favor of the equal population principle are Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and
Mr. Justice Goldberg. Dissenting are Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr.
Justice Stewart.
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cases, but the effect which this decision will have upon state legislatures is difficult to estimate. The apportionment problem is serious,
and also far more complicated than many of the opinions indicate.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, accuses the majority
of converting "a particular political philosophy into a constitutional
rule."42 Among political scientists, historians, and others who have
considered the various theories of apportionment for representative
government, 43 no one theory has ever commanded unanimous approval." The vital component of any apportionment plan is people,
and any system which consistently denies large majorities any effective voice in the state legislature should not be allowed. But it does
not necessarily follow that the equal population principle is the most
desirable rule which can be devised as a standard for apportioning
both houses of a state legislature. Legislators represent a majority
of the voters in their districts and quite often the needs and interests
of these voters can be related to the geographical areas in which they
live. Mr. Justice Stewart submits that if, as the Court suggests,
geographical residence is irrelevant, the equal population principle
should require the abolition of districts and the holding of all elections at large. 45 This observation may overstate the Court's reasoning,
but it does seem that the Court should give, in addition to the legalistic analysis of the problem, some recognition to rational state apportionment plans where the districts of one house are based on nonpopulation factors.
42. Lucas v. General Assembly, supra note 4, at 748 (dissenting opinion).

See also

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Baker v. Carr, supra note 5, at 300: "What is
actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among competing bases of
representation-ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy ....
"
43. Some of the possible bases upon which the states could be apportioned are:
(1) territorial surveys, (2) governmental boundaries, (3) official bodies, (4) functional divisions of the population, or (5) free population alignments. These and other
theories of representative government are discussed and evaluated in the material
cited in note 44 infra.
44. See, e.g., CuBER & KENKEL, SocLL SmTrwicAION in =HEUNrrED STATES
227-48, 292-96 (1954); DAnL, A PREFACE TO DocRATc THEORY (1956); DE GAzrA,
ApPORmTONmENT AND REPRESENTATIvE CovRNmmT (1963); HARRrs, THE QUEST FOR
EQUALITY (1960); MiLL, REPRESENTATIVE GoVER ENT (1961); de Grazia, General
Theory of Apportionment, 17 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRoB. 256 (1952).
45. Lucas v. General Assembly, supranote 4, at 750 (dissenting opinion).
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Constitutional Law-Twenty-first AmendmentScope of State Power Over Intoxicants
Moving Within Its Borders
The Supreme Court recently gave a fresh examination to the scope
of the states' power over alcoholic beverages under the twenty-first
amendment. At Kennedy International Airport a unique type of
export business was being conducted by the Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp. Under the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930,1 liquor
was purchased from bonded warehouses outside New York and
brought directly to Bon Voyage's place of business at the airport.
There it was sold duty free to passengers boarding international
flights. The passengers chose and paid for their liquor at embarkation;
however, the liquor was placed directly on the plane to be delivered
to the purchaser at his foreign destination. A New York statute requires that establishments selling liquor must have an entrance at
street level.2 Being unable to conform to this requirement, Bon
Voyage was informed that its business would have to be terminated.
Bon Voyage sought to enjoin the New York liquor authorities from
interfering in its business, alleging that such restrictions were a
violation of the commerce clause and contrary to the Tariff Act of
1930. 3 A three judge federal court granted the injunction 4 and on
direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court held, affinned. Transportation of liquor through New York was not importation "for
delivery or use therein" within the meaning of the twenty-first amendment and thus could not be completely prohibited. Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
A decision handed down at the same time concerned the power
of Kentucky to levy an importation tax of ten cents per proof gallon
on incoming Scotch whiskey.5 James B. Beam Distilling Co., an importer, held the exclusive franchise in the United States for a wellknown brand of Scotch, which was brought into the country via the
ports of New Orleans and Chicago and then shipped direct to the
Beam warehouses in Kentucky. After paying the required tax, the
distilling company filed a claim for a refund, alleging that the tax
1. 46 Stat. 691 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1311 (1958). This law provides that goods
produced under its provisions may be shipped duty free under the control of customs
officials.
2. N.Y. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAw § 105(2).
3. 46 Stat. 691 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1311 (1958).
4. Idlewild Bon-Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 212 F. Supp. 376 (1962).
5. There was some question whether the tax was a license tax or an import tax but
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the incidence of the tax was on the act of
transporting the liquor. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 367 S.W.2d
267, at 270 (Ky. 1963).
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was an impost in violation of the import-export clause. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the Kentucky Tax Commission and
the circuit court and granted the refund. 6 On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The tax upon the importation
of the liquor was an impost within the meaning of the import-export
clause, and, being expressly forbidden by this clause, could not be
permitted under the twenty-first amendment. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam DistillingCo., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
Section 2 of the twenty-first amendment provides: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 7 This obviously
places in the hands of the states a large measure of control over
intoxicants, but the history of the amendment shows that the extent
of this power has been the source of much controversy and litigation.8 Some authorities contend, as is claimed by the states in the
present cases, that Congress intended for each state to have absolute
power over all intoxicants within its borders, at any time, for any
purpose. 9 Others take a more liberal view and would grant the
states only the amount of control reasonably necessary to protect
the integrity of their own laws.' 0 The Supreme Court seemed to
embrace the former view in State Board of Equalization v. Young's
Market Co." There the Court upheld the right of California to
impose a license fee upon importers of beer, saying that while such
a discriminatory12 action would have been a violation of the commerce
clause prior to the twenty-first amendment, this was not the case
after its passage. The Court dismissed the contention that the tax
was a denial of equal protection of the law stating that "a classification
recognized by the twenty-first amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the fourteenth." 3 That this case suggested no limits to
6. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, supra note 5.
CoNST. amend. XXI, § 2.
8. Prior to the enactment of the twenty-first amendment, the Congress had acted
to give the states some control over liquor in interstate commerce. The Webb-Kenyon
Act and the Wilson Act were voided by the eighteenth amendment, but with the
twenty-first amendment they are once again in force. 37 Stat. 699 (1913), 27 U.S.C.
§ 12 (1958); 26 Stat. 313 (1890), 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1958).
9. Kallenbach, Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors Under the 21st Amendment, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 474 (1940).
10. Crabb, State Power Over Liquor Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 12 U.
DEr. L.J. 11 (1949); DeGanahl, The Scope of Federal Power Over Alcoholic Beverages Since the Twenty-first Amendment, 8 GEo. WAstH. L. REv. 819 (1940).
11. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
12. This was a license fee upon the right to import beer. Even though sellers of
beer within the state had to pay a tax; any tax upon the right to import is a violation
of the commerce clause. Id. at 62.
13. Supra note 11, at 64.

7. U.S.
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the power of the states is indicated by the description of the amendment in Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion: "The Amendment which 'prohibited' the 'transportation or importation' of intoxicating liquors
into any state 'in violation of the laws thereof,' abrogated the right
to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating liquors." 14 It is small
wonder that Young's Market'5 came to stand for the proposition
that there were no restrictions upon a state's power under the twentyfirst amendment. Inevitably the states sought to extend their control
over liquor to shipments merely moving through their boundaries. In
Duckworth v. Arkansas' 6 and Carter v. Virginia,7 Arkansas and Virginia had enacted statutes which required a license to ship liquor
across the state. These requirements were objected to as violating
the commerce clause. Thus, the Court was faced squarely with the
opportunity to decide whether the twenty-first amendment and
Young's Market 18 covered the regulation of such through shipments.
However, the Court circumvented the issue by upholding the statutes
upon entirely different grounds. The Virginia action was allowed
because the liquor shipment was in violation of the laws of the state
for which it was intended, and the Arkansas statute was held a legitimate exercise of the state police power to protect against the possible
diversion of the liquor into illegal channels. The result of these decisions was that the scope of the states' authority over liquor was not
limited, although several Justices concurring in the results stated
their belief that the statutes should have been upheld on the basis
of the twenty-first amendment. 19 A single exception to the state's
plenary power over intoxicants concerned the passage of liquor
through the territory of a state into a federal enclave. In Collins v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co.20 and Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co.2 1
the Court denied the right of a state to prohibit such shipments into
an area under federal jurisdiction.
Few cases have arisen involving the propriety of taxes upon the
importation of foreign liquor. None, prior to the Beam22 case, had
reached the Supreme Court since the enactment of the twenty-first
14. Supranote 11, at 62.

15. Supra note 11.
16. 314 U.S. 390 (1941).

17. 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
18. Supra note 11.
19. Mr. Justice Jackson in Duckworth v. Arkansas felt this was a "gross and unwarranted extension of the police power," but that the statute was permissible tnder
the twenty-first amendment. 314 U.S. at 397. Three Justices concurred in Carter v.
Virginia on the theory that the abrogation of the commerce clause extended to transportation of liquor through the state. 321 U.S. at 138, 139.
20. 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
21. 321 U.S. 383 (1944).

22. Dept. of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
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amendment. Two state court decisions involving the imposition of
personal property taxes upon imports stored in the "original package" invalidated the taxes as violative of the import-export clause of
the Constitution.23
In both Hostetter24 and Beam25 it is conceded that as a result of
the twenty-first amendment the traditional commerce clause limitations do not restrict the states in their action concerning alcoholic
beverages intended for use, distribution, or consumption within their
borders. Additionally, it is recognized that states have broad discretionary powers to regulate and channel the flow of liquor both from
within the state out and from without their borders through them,
although as indicated previously there is some doubt as to the source
of this latter power. However, in the instant decisions, the Court emphatically denies that the twenty-first amendment has completely abrogated either the commerce clause or the import-export clause. The
Court points out that in any concrete factual situation the seemingly
conflicting parts of the Constitution must be considered together as
parts of the same document. This was the case, so the Court says,
in Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co.,26 where it was held that
the words "for delivery or use therein" had a very distinct meaning
and did not contemplate the inclusion of all liquor traffic. These
words, which were omitted by the Court in Young's Market,27 became
the basis of a significant limitation in Hostetter.28 Had New York
acted in an attempt "to regulate or control the passage of intoxicants through her territory in the interest of preventing their unlawful
diversion into the internal commerce," 29 it is assumed that the action
would have been proper. However, this was not the manifest purpose of the New York statute, and since these intoxicants were intended ultimately for delivery and use in some foreign jurisdiction,
the total prevention of their passage was beyond the scope of the
authority of New York. Transportation through a state for use elsewhere is not "delivery or use therein" within the meaning of the
twenty-first amendment.
The rationale of Beam is that while the twenty-first amendment
has abrogated traditional commerce clause limitations on a state's
power to control liquor for "delivery or use" within its borders, the
23. Parrot & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 131 Cal. App. 2d 332, 280 P.2d
881 (1955); State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review, 15 Wis. 2d 330, 112

N.W.2d 914 (1962).
24. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
25. Supra note 22.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Supra note 20.
Supra note 11.
Supra note 24.
Id. at 333.
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amendment has had no similar effect upon the import-export clause.
Rather than a broad grant of power to Congress, as is given by the
commerce clause, the import-export clause flatly prohibits any impost
upon foreign goods entering the United States. Accommodation of
the import-export prohibition with the twenty-first amendment is
somewhat more difficult in this case than in Hostetter,30 and the
Court states bluntly that the allowance of this tax would "require
nothing short of squarely holding that the twenty-first amendment
has completely repealed the import-export clause as far as intoxicants are concerned."3'
By virtue of these cases the Supreme Court has completely extinguished as a valid legal proposition the claim that a state has
unlimited power over all alcoholic beverages within its borders. Hereafter a state may exclude or place discriminatory burdens only upon
liquor which is intended "for delivery or use" within the state. Only
regulations reasonably calculated to protect the laws of the state
may be imposed upon liquor within the confines of the state but not
intended for "delivery or use" therein. This seems to be a reasonable
interpretation of the twenty-first amendment and in harmony with
the concept of unfettered commerce among the states. However, the
Court has created something of an ambiguity by failing adequately
to define "delivery or use therein" or the much broader phrase adopted
by the Court-"use, distribution, or consumption." Since the meaning of these terms defines the scope of the power a state possesses
over certain intoxicants, it is imperative that they be more clearly
delineated. The most logical conclusion is that the liquor must be
intended for human consumption-actual drinking within a state
before it is "importation .. .for use, distribution, or consumption."

This interpretation is borne out by the facts in both Hostetter and
Beam. In Hostetter the Court emphasizes that the intoxicants involved are intended for "ultimate" delivery and use outside New
York, even though there is a preliminary transaction within the state
which would qualify as "use" or "distribution" under any normal
construction of the terms. Consider the situation that arises in Beam
if "use, distribution, or consumption" is interpreted in the customary
sense of meaning any sort of commercial activity within the state.
Surely the storage of liquor in warehouses and subsequent shipment
to other states qualifies as distribution or use. But if such be the
case, Kentucky will be allowed to prohibit the entry of liquor which
she could not under the same circumstances tax; thus thwarting the
purpose of the import-export prohibition, i.e., the retention of control
30. Supra note 24.

31. Dept. of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., supra note 22, at 345.
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over international trade by the federal government. A more dramatic
example of the problems which could arise if use and distribution
might mean something other than human consumption is presented
in the case of port cities. Once again there is no denying that the
operation involved here is a classic example of both use and distribution, but it seems improbable that the twenty-first amendment was
intended to allow states to prohibit the entrance of these foreign
intoxicants. Yet in spite of the facts which indicate human consumption should be the sole criterion and the seeming acceptance of this
in Hostetter, the Court continues to treat "use, distribution, and consumption" as mutually exclusive terms, indicating that at times liquor
could be in a state for use or distribution, although intended to be
consumed elsewhere. The resulting ambiguity is almost certain to
lead to confusion and additional litigation.

Evidence-Statutory Presumptions-Reasonableness

Is

Implicit in Test of Rational Connection
Defendants drove to an unregistered still early one morning and
upon their arrival were immediately arrested. On trial in federal
district court, defendants were convicted on three counts of violating
Internal Revenue Code provisions regulating illegal distilling. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, reversed.Although the government had presented enough evidence to prove
defendants' guilt,2 the statutory presumptions created by section
5601(b) of the Code,3 allowing the presence of a person at the site
of an unregistered still to be sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, are unconstitutional, thus necessitating a new trial. Barrett v.
United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
1. Defendants were tried on four counts of violating Internal Revenue Code provisions pertaining to illegal distilling. Count one charged possession of an unregistered
still under § 5601(a)(1). Count two charged the carrying on of the business of a
distiller without having posted the bond required under § 5601(a)(4). Count three
charged the carrying on of the business of a distiller with intent to defraud the
United States of taxes under § .5602. Count four charged work in a distillery which
neither posted the name of the operator nor identified the business. The court
of appeals directed a new trial on counts one and two, the ones in issue for the
purpose of this comment. The court further found no intent to defraud and reversed
a conviction on count three. A verdict of not guilty had been directed on the fourth
count in the district court. Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1963).
2. Commenting on the evidence which the government had presented, the court
concluded "that the record shows sufficient evidence on the first two counts to support
a jury finding that the defendants were in possession of the unregistered distillery."
Barrett v. United States, supra note 1, at 301.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 5601(b):
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Generally, the legislature has power to create and determine the
effect of evidentiary presumptions. However, this power is subject4
to limitations which are especially important in criminal statutes.
The problem inherent in presumptions in criminal cases is that while

presumptions serve to relieve the state of the necessity of producing
certain evidence, they must not be allowed to substitute for proof

itself. That is, the constitutional protections afforded a defendant in
a criminal trial may not be jeopardized by the legislature's desire

to ease the burden of the state in prosecuting that trial. Awareness
of this problem led the Supreme Court, in 1910, to formulate a test
by which such legislative presumptions could be examined:
That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may
not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law it is only essential that there shall be some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and
that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. 5

The Court did not adhere to this test of rational connection between
fact proved and ultimate fact presumed, and in 1934, in Morrison v.

California,6 it propounded another test. "What is proved must be so
related to what is inferred in the case of a true presumption as to
(1) "Whenever . . .the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where,
and at the time when, a still or distilling apparatus was set up without having been
registered, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction
of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury)."
(2) "Whenever ...the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where,
and at the time when, the business of a distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or
carried on, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction
of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury)."
4. "In the judicial decisions and in the text books there is much confused and
confusing language about presumptions, presumptions of law, presumptions of fact,
presumptive evidence, conclusive presumptions. Speaking generally whenever the
term is used, it describes a relationship between one fact or group of facts and another
fact or group of facts." MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 31 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS]. For a good basic discussion of the subject
of presumptions see MORGAN, MAGUrE, & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 438-43
(1957). For one view of the legislature's power to change or establish presumptions
see 4 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1356 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore's broad statement of the
legislature's power over presumptions has not been universally accepted; Mr. Justice
Holmes stated the power a bit more restrictively. "As to the presumptions, of course
the legislature may go a good way in raising one or in changing the burden of proof,
but there are limits ... [Ilt is not within the province of a legislature to declare an
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." McFarland v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916). Some five approaches to statutory presumptions
have been noted. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 313 (1954).
5. Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
6. 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
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be at least a warning signal according to the teachings of experience." 7
While commentators generally favor this test, 8 the Court finally
accepted the test of rational connection as the sole test of a statutory
presumption in Tot v. United States.9 Holding that rational connection was the only test that could be used, the Court, in the following
language, rejected the government's proffer of a second test based on
comparative convenience in the production of evidence: "We are of
the opinion that these are not independent tests but that the first is
controlling and the second but a corollary." 0 Unfortunately, the
Court did not indicate the importance or relevance of this corollary.
Comparative convenience seems to have no place under an exclusive
test of rational connection; if the inference created is permissible
under the test of rational connection, comparative convenience can
add nothing to uphold the presumption in question. For these reasons,
the decision in Tot has been criticized," as has the selection of the
standard of rational connection as the sole test of statutory presumptions. 12 Tot did firmly establish one test by which to measure presumptions, but it left much to be desired in the way of analysis of
statutory pre-presumptions. 13 Manning v. United States, 4 decided by
7. Id. at 90. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in writing the majority opinion, would undoubtedly deny that he was advocating a "test" as such. Id. at 91.
8. See note 11 infra.
9. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The section of the Federal Firearms Act, 52 Stat. 1250
(1938), which established a presumption that a person previously convicted of a
crime of violence found possessing a firearm had received it in interstate commerce
was declared unconstitutional.
10. 319 U.S. at 467. The Court noted that defendants generally have a better
means of knowledge of the alleged crime than does the government, but concluded
that this imbalance could not support such a presumption. "In every criminal case
the defendant has at least an equal familiarity with the facts and in most a greater
familiarity with them than the prosecution. It might, therefore, be argued that to
place upon all defendants in criminal cases the burden of going forward with the
evidence would be proper. But the argument proves too much. If it were sound,
the legislature might validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof
of the identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the
facts essential to guilt. This is not permissible." Id. at 469.
11. MCCORMICc, supra note 4, at 657-58; Hale, Necessity of Logical Inference to
Support a Presumption, 17 So. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1943); Morgan, Tot v. United States:
Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1943).
12. Morgan, supranote 11, at 1328-29.
13. "The Court did not trouble to consider critically the words of the Act...
The Court cited indiscriminately previous decisions dealing with state statutes and with
congressional acts in civil and criminal cases; and it made no distinction between
statutes making one fact prima facie evidence of another and statutes making the
establishment of one fact in an action determine the allocation of the burden of going
forward with evidence, or the burden of persuading the trier, as to another fact.
In short, it treated every such enactment as creating a presumption and proceeded to
state general rules concerning the validity of all statutory presumptions. It did not
define a presumption or describe its exact operation in an action." Id. at 1326.
14. 274 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1960).
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the same court which decided the instant case, best demonstrates the
difficulty of attempting to blend the test of rational connection with
the doctrine of comparative convenience. There, a statute was upheld
that raised a presumption, for purposes of venue, that marihuana was
obtained in the jurisdiction in which possession was proved. The court
stated that legislature had broad power to "establish a rule of presumptive evidence that is essentially a reasonable regulation of the
burden of proof, reasonable because the explanation of the possession
of marihuana is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant."' 5
The court does not clarify whether it found a rational connection and
employed comparative convenience as a makeweight argument or,
burden of the government in obtaining conviction, it found the
rational connection required by Tot.16 Regrettably, as the Court in
Tot, the court in Manning made no attempt to explain precisely what
the "secondary test" of comparative convenience means. Left in this
unsatisfactory state, the treatment given statutory presumptions is
more confusing than enlightening, and, except for the test of rational
connection, no realistic method has been set out to analyze presumptions-one leading to distinctions between the various types and
differentiating between the treatment that should be accorded each.
The difficulty of obtaining conviction under the statutes concerning
illegal distilling was highlighted by the Supreme Court's holding in
Bozza v. United States17 that, because several offenses have been
created by breaking down the process of illicit distilling, testimony to
prove any specific offense "must point directly to conduct within the
narrow margins which the statute alone defines." 8 The practical
impossibility of meeting this judicial standard prompted Congress'
express circumvention of Bozza,19 in the statute declared unconstitu15. Id. at 930.
16. The language of the court, in speaking of the report of the House Committee
on Ways and Means concerning the statute involved in Manning, indicates this uncertainty. "To our mind, the language of the Committee Report simply indicates an
awareness by Congress of the difficulties inherent in the administration of the act.
These difficulties were the reason for the statutory presumption. The language of the
report is consistent with the principle of comparative convenience, the secondary test
of the validity of a statutory presumption, as expressed in Tot .... " Id. at 931.
17. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
18. Id. at 163.
19. The language of the report of the Senate Finance Committee indicated this
intent. "Their purpose is to create a rebuttable presumption of guilt in the case of a
person who is found at illicit distilling or rectifying premises, but who, because of
the practical impossibility of proving his actual participation in the illegal activities
except by inference drawn from his presence when the illegal acts were committed,
cannot be convicted under the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bozza v. United States
(330 U.S. 160). The prevention of the illicit production or rectification of alcoholic
spirits, and the consequent defrauding of the United States of tax, has long been
rendered more difficult by the failure to obtain a conviction of a person discovered at
the site of illicit distilling or rectifying premises, but who was not, at the time of
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tional in the instant case. Congress did so by making presence at the
site of a still sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of the crime
of possession of that still unless the defendant explains such presence
to the satisfaction of the trier of fact.
The court in the instant case read the test of rational connection
"as a test of reasonableness more than of bare rationality: to comply
with the due process clause, proof of the fact upon which the statutory presumption is based must carry a reasonable inference of the
ultimate fact presumed."20 Under this construction of rational connection, the court held that the presumptions created here could not
stand, as "possession of a thing such as a still involves the highly
technical legal concept of dominion, control."2' 1 Mere presence at a
still has repeatedly been held not to be enough to give an inference
of possession of that still.2m While noting that the presumptions were
grounded on the comparative convenience in the production of evi-

dence in these cases, the court did not let this affect its determination of the reasonableness of the presumptions. 23 Finally, the court,
holding that the evidence was otherwise sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty, remanded the case for a new trial, since it was imhave been
possible to determine the extent to which the jury might
24
influenced by the instructions as to the presumptions.
Much of the confusion about statutory presumptions results from
an unfortunate tendency of the courts to rely too much on a test of
constitutionality that can be applied to presumptions and too little
on an analysis of the presumptions themselves to determine their
purposes and effects. "There is an important difference between
using one fact as evidence of another, and causing the establishment
such discovery, engaged in doing any specific act. In the Bozza case, the Supreme
Court took the position that to sustain conviction, the testimony 'must point directly
to conduct within the narrow margins which the statute alone defines.' These new
provisions are designed to avoid the effect of that holding as to future violations."
S. REP. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 188-89 (1958).
20. 322 F.2d at 297. As to the reasonableness of the inference created here, "there
are many inferences other than possession which can be drawn from presence at a still.
A defendant might be a hunter who stumbled upon the still . . . .He might even be
a prospective purchaser of the liquor. He might be present for any one of dozens of
other equally probable reasons having nothing to do with possession." Id. at 300.
21. Id. at 299.
22. "This Court has held, time and again, that 'mere presence at a still site cannot
support a conviction for violation of the liquor laws relative to the still." Ibid., citing
cases.

23. "Mere convenience to the Government in proving its case is not a sufficient
basis for presumption. That is Tot's teaching." Id. at 298. Tot's teaching is, unfortunately, not that simple. If courts ignore comparative convenience, that part of
Tot will not have to be worried about. This is perhaps the preferable way for comparative convenience to be dealt with, at least until the Supreme Court spells out what
is meant by this corollary.
24. Id. at 301. See note 2 supra.
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of one fact to fix the burden of coming forward with evidence tending
to establish the other or the burden of persuading the trier of fact of
the existence of the other." 5 That such a difference in the nature of
the presumptions considered in this comment exists is shown when
an analysis of the presumptions involved is made.25 The presumption created in the instant case made presence at the site of a still
prima facie evidence of a crime-possession of an unregistered still.
In Tot, on the other hand, the establishment of the fact of possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence determined the allocation of the burden of proof.27 The same
is true of the presumption created in Manning. The Tot and Manning
type of presumption has been upheld and generally should be, for
such a presumption "is a necessary concomitant to our adversary
system. It involves judgment as to practicability, convenience, and
fairness which has no necessary connection with the process of reason25. Morgan, supra note 11, at 1328.
26. The presumptions created in the instant case appear in note 3 supra. The Tot
presumption was: "[TIhe possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such person
shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped . . .in
violation of this Act." Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 464 (1943). The Manning
presumption was: "Proof that any person shall have had in his possession any marihuana
. .. shall be presumptive evidence of guilt under this subsection . . ." Manning v.
United States, 274 F.2d 926, 928 (1960).
27. A very legitimate argument can be raised as to which burden was actually placed
on the defendant in a Tot-type situation. "But very often the term burden of proof
is used to describe either one of these risks [the risk of non-production of evidence
and the risk of non-persuasion of the jury] of [sic] both of them combined. At times
the meaning vill be clear from the context; at other times, the result would be the
same whether one or the other or both of the risks is meant; at still other times the
result seems to indicate a failure to discriminate." MoRcAN, BASIC PRODLEMS 19.
In Tot, the burden of producing evidence rather than the risk of non-persuasion of
the jury appears to have been placed on the defendant. Query, however, whether
both burdens of proof may be placed on a defendant in a criminal trial? Thus, Mr.
Justice Cardozo wrote in Morrison: "The decisions are manifold that within limits of
reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal
prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these, that the
state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel
what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing
of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will
be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or
oppression." Morrison v. United States, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1933). (Emphasis added.)
Query as to which burden Cardozo meant? Both? The commentators are of little
help in this area. "In the long course of the history of burden of proof-whether
it be the burden of going forward with the evidence or the burden of persuasionone will look in vain for any single principle for determining its allocation either in
civil or criminal procedure." Hale, supra note 11, at 51. Wigmore says that the risk
of non-persuasion of the jury never "shifts." 9 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2489.
Professor Morgan disagrees with Wigmore; he contends that each, or both, burden can
rest on either party. "In other words, the judge must decide which party must carry
the risk of non-production of evidence sufficient to justify a jury in making a specified
finding, and which party the risk of non-persuasion of the jury to make the finding.
The former is usually called the burden of producing evidence and the latter the
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ing from one fact to another."28 Rational connection as a test of
29
presumptions has no logical application to such a presumption.
Only in a case such as the instant one, where evidence of one fact
(presence) is to be used as evidence of another (possession), can the
test of rational connection, if it is to be used at all, have a logical
application. 0 It is in such a case that the constitutional safeguards
of a defendant's rights in a criminal trial need to be protected by a
"test" of statutory presumptions against a legislative attempt to ease
the government's ability to secure convictions. Attempting to apply
31
one test to all statutory presumptions has obviously led to confusion;
that it is foolish to insist on only one such test of all such presumptions- was perhaps best spelled out by Mr. Justice Cardozo in

Morrison v. California:
burden of persuasion." MoRGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS 18-19. While this analysis does not
necessarily support the power of the legislature to place the risk of non-persuasion
of the jury on the defendant in a criminal trial, Professor Morgan's analysis of the
decision in Tot does. Morgan, supra note 11, at 1328-30. One final query: whether,
for the purposes of analyzing statutory presumptions, it makes any difference to distinguish between the two burdens of proof? "[I]t is quite immaterial whether the
procedural effect given to the statute is to place the one or the other burden upon the
party upon whom the presumption operates." Hale, supra note 11, at 48.
28. Morgan, supra note 11, at 1328. This analysis strongly suggests that comparative convenience can be one factor, and a very valid one, in determining whether the
limits imposed on a presumption which changes the burden of proof have been
transcended.
29. "But how does it follow that the Constitution makes the same demand where
the establishment of A fixes the burden of producing evidence or the burden of persuasion as to B?" Id. at 1329. See note 30 infra.
30. "If the statute as construed permits or requires evidence of A to be used as
evidence of B, then the existence of a rational connection between them is demanded
by the Constitution." Id. at 1328-29.
31. Thus the court in the instant case had a great deal of trouble in distinguishing
its decision from its earlier decision in Manning V. United States. The language of the
report of the House Committee on Ways and Means given at the time of passage of
the statute upheld in Manning was very similar to the language used by the Senate
Finance Committee in this case. See note 19 supra. "Under existing law it is unlawful
for any transferee to acquire or otherwise obtain marihuana without payment of tax.
It is difilcult under existing law to prove the unlawful acquisition of marihuana in the
jurisdiction where the defendant is apprehended. Sometimes the Government's own
evidence will indicate that the defendant acquired the marihuana in another venue.
This handicap would be overcome by providing for venue not only in the jurisdiction
where acquisition occurred but also in the jurisdiction where possession was discovered."
H. R. REP. No. 2388, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956). The court's answer to this
attempt was favorable, as was noted previously. Note 11 supra. The only way the
two cases can reasonably be harmonized is to note that the presumptions created in
the two cases were different with different criteria needed to examine them.
32. If only one test is to be used, the "test" of Morrison would seem designed to
fill that purpose. "What is proved must be so related to what is inferred in the case
of a true presumption as to be at least a warning signal according to the teachings
of experience." 291 U.S. at 90. This test has a great deal of application here in
light of the repeated judicial holdings that presence at a still is not sufficient, without
more, to show possession of that still. While it may be granted that the difficulty in
obtaining conviction under the statutes concerning illicit distilling was equal to that
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The decisive considerations are too variable, too much distinctions of
degree, too dependent in the last analysis upon a common sense estimate of
fairness or of facilities of proof, to be crowded into a formula. One can do
no more than adumbrate them; sharper definition must await the specific
case as it arises. 3
Perhaps Justice Cardozo's structure can be modified if the use of

the test of rational connection is limited to only those cases in which

proof of one fact is to be used as evidence of another fact; to do so,
of course, a detailed analysis of the particular presumption involved

is essential. Having made such an analysis, however, a court can
eliminate much of the confusion inherent in the use of one test to

examine all statutory presumptions and provide a flexibility of treatment without sacrificing clarity and consistency of application that
cannot exist when only one test is used.
of obtaining conviction under the narcotics laws and was a strong arguing point in
favor of the presumptions created here, such difficulty may not be used to support
a presumption when experience doesn't indicate that such an inference exists in fact.
"No doubt the court may be convinced that the legislature in a given case is not
purporting to exercise a judgment as to the relationship in experience between two
facts, but is using a formula expressing such a relationship in order to accomplish
quite another purpose. If so, then it may well ignore the expression and insist that,
however desirable the purpose, it must not be accomplished by illegitimate means."
Morgan, supra note 11, at 1325.
33. 291 U.S. at 91.
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Products Liability-Uniform Commercial CodeImplied Warranty Extends to Employee Who
Contracts to Buy in Behalf of Employer
Plaintiff, an employee of a hotel, purchased from a retail liquor store
four bottles of champagne to be consumed by guests at the hotel. As
plaintiff was preparing to serve the champagne, a cap blew off one of
the bottles, striking and injuring his eye. Plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant wine producer, contending that the alleged
defect in the bottle or cap constituted a breach of an implied warranty that (1) the goods were safely packaged, and (2) the goods
were fit for such purposes as were intended by the sale. The trial
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that implied warranty
is limited to purchasers or sub-purchasers' who are in the contractual
chain of purchase. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
held, reversed. An employee who contracts to buy in behalf of his
employer is placed within the definition of "buyer" in section 2-1032
of the Uniform Commercial Code and is therefore within the chain
of distribution and can avail himself of the remedy of breach of
implied warranty conferred under section 2.318.3 Yentzer v. Taylor
Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).
The requirement that there be privity of contract before an action
can be brought on implied warranty against- the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective product has received considerable attention in
both case law and treatises. 4 Most of the older cases adhered to the
rigid privity requirement for implied warranty actions.5 The essence
1. The sub-purchaser is not the immediate vendee of the manufacturer but is at
least one sale removed from the manufacturer.
2. "'Buyer' means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit.
12A, § 2-103(1) (a)(1954).
3. "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A,
§ 2-318 (1954).
4. For excellent articles dealing with strict liability, privity, and implied warranty
in products liability, see Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use:
Recent Developments, 16 RuTrGERs L. REv. 493 (1962); Noel, Manufacturers of
Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963 (1957); Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Roberts, Implied Warranties
-The Privity Rule and Strict Liability, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194 (1962).
For an article supporting the requirement of privity, see Waite, Retail Responsibility
and Judicial Law Making, 34 MicHr. L. REv. 494 (1936). For good discussions of the
privity concept see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960); Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
5. Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930); Kennedy v.
Brockelman Bros., 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747 (1956). But it should be noted that
privity is not a requirement in products liability cases based on negligence. See Loch
v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
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of this requirement is that the injured party may bring his action of
implied warranty only against his immediate seller, 6 or, as one court
stated, the warranty does not "run with the goods." 7 As a result of

the recent trend toward consumer protection, the privity requirement
has been eliminated in certain areas: first in cases involving dangerous
instrumentalities, 8 then in food cases, 9 and, more recently, in cases

where the plaintiff had relied on the national advertising of the
producer defendant. 10 These extensions of the implied warranty actions against the manufacturer limited the action to the actual subpurchaser and did not extend the chain of distribution to the family"

or employees' 2 of the sub-purchaser, who were limited to an action13
of trespass for alleged negligence in the manufacturing process.

The privity barrier has now been further diminished by the extension

of implied warranty to the family 14 and guests 15 of the purchaser.

Both case law 16 and the Code 1'7 have adopted this view. The cases

are split, however, as to whether an injured employee who consumes
or uses the goods of the sub-buyer can bring an action of implied
6. Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942);
Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953), 8 VAND. L. REV.

149 (1954).
7. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 260, 111 N.E. 785, 786 (1916).
8. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1962) (power tool); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, supra note
4 (automobile); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (airplane).
9. Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914);
Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 AUt. 537 (1931); Catani
v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 AtI. 931 (1915); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913) (food product in a sealed package). See also CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42-16 (1958).
10. Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959); PnossEn, TORrs
§ 97, at 674 (3d ed. 1964).
11. Hazelton v. First Natl Stores, Inc., 88 N.H. 409, 190 AUt. 280 (1937); Duncan
v. Juman, 25 N.J. Super. 330, 96 A.2d 415 (1953). (child denied recovery because
mother was actual purchaser).
12. Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 (1935);
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
13. Loch v. Confair, supra note 5.
14. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Bender v. Champion
Light Works, 40 Misc. 2d 139, 242 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1963); Decker & Sons v. Capps,
supra note 4; Swift & Co. v. Wells, supra note 10.
15. Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1957). Contra,
Serrano v. Riverside Dinette Prod. Co., 222 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
16. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
17. UNwoimu CoimmEacm.L CODE § 2-318, quoted supra note 3 [hereinafter
cited as U.C.C.]. See also comment 3 to § 2-318. "[B]eyond this the section is neutral
and not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extends to other persons in the distributive
chain."
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The 1949 Tentative Draft of the Uniform Commercial

Code (which was not adopted) would have substantially resolved
this problem by providing that the implied warranty would be extended to "one whose relationship to . . . [the buyer] is such as to
make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or
be affected by the goods ... ."19 This proposal conforms with the
trend of implied warranty in recent years. In order to avoid the
strict privity requirement, the courts have invented such ingenious
theories as a fictitious agency to purchase for the injured consumer
or user,20 an assignment of the manufacturer's warranty to the immediate vendee,2 1 and third party beneficiary contracts.22 Some state
statutes enacted before the adoption of the Code have also negated
the privity barrier. Indiana extended the action of implied warranty
by defining "buyer" as "aperson who buys or agrees to buy goods ...
18. For cases allowing the employee's recovery in implied warranty, see Jakubowski
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Corp., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 186, 193 A.2d 275, 282. (1963).
"It [implied warranty action] arises because the manufacturer or seller, in marketing
his goods, assumes such a responsibility toward any consumer or user who, in reasonable contemplation, might be injured."; Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339,
347-48, 353 P.2d 575, 581 (1960). "'Privity' denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same thing or right of property; it implies succession . . . . Thus .. .the
employee had the successive right to the possession and use of the grinding wheel
handed over to him by his purchaser-employer, and, we believe, should fairly be concourt allowed
sidered to be in privity to the vendor-manufacturer ....... .This
recovery on grounds that the employees were part of the "industrial 'family.'"; Vallis v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Williams
v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1962); See also
Hart v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp. 817, 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963),
where the court relied on IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-115 and 58-606 (1961), which defines
"buyer" as "a person who buys or agrees to buy goods .. . [or] any legal succession
in interest of such person" to make the action in implied warranty available to the
sub-buyer's employee. For cases which have not allowed consumer employees to
recover on implied warranty, see Odum v. Gulf Tire & Supply Co., 196 F. Supp. 35
(N.D. Fla. 1961); Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock, 103 Ga. App. 842, 120 S.E.2d 912 (1961)
(relying on GA. CoDE ANN. § 96-307); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241,
382 P.2d 399 (1963) (employee injured by a defective ladder purchased by his
employer from the defendant-manufacturer could not recover on implied warranty
because of the lack of privity); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187
A.2d 575 (1963) (bartender injured by defendant-manufacturer's bottle exploding
could not sue on implied warranty as this action is limited to the actual sub-purchaser
or his family or household guests; this court would not extend the action beyond §
2-318 of the U.C.C.); Barlow v. DeVilBiss Co., 214 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Wis.
1963) (refusal to extend privity to an industrial employee). See also Waite, Retail
Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, supra note 4, for policy arguments for not
extending the manufacturer's liability without privity of contract.
19. U.C.C. § 2-318 (May 1949 Tentative Draft). (Emphasis added.)
20. Grinnel v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp., 282 Mich. 509, 276 N.W. 535
(1937); Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955); PRossia,
TORTS § 97, at 678 (3d ed. 1964); Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE.
L. Rzv. 119, 153-55 (1957) (a collection of at least twenty-nine such theories).
21. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d
445 (1936).
22. Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1941).
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Connecticut

extended the right of recovery to any member of the buyer's house-

hold.2 The Code broadens the Connecticut statute by allowing the
action to be brought by a "person who is in the family or household
of his buyer or who is a guest in his home . . . ."2 Except for this
section, the Code remains neutral on the requirements of privity for

an action of implied warranty and allows the states to develop their

own case law on this point.26 Thus, far, however, no court has allowed
recovery on implied warranty to an injured bystander who was out-

side the chain of distribution and who neither used nor consumed
the product. 7

In the instant case, the court based its decision on sections 2-1032B
and 2-31829 of the Code. It first classified the plaintiff-employee as a

"buyer," using the definition found in section 2-103.30 The majority
interpreted the phrase "contracts to buy"3 ' as encompassing an agency

type of relationship between the actual buyer and his employee, holding that a person who "contracts to buy" means a person who pur-

chases in behalf of the vendee. Second, the court applied section
2-318-s and placed the plaintiff-buyer within the protected category
of that section.P The dissenting opinion argues that in order for

the plaintiff to come within section 2-318,34 he must be vested with
a beneficial interest in the wine. Since the plaintiff had no interest
in the product, the dissent argued that he does not come within the
statutory definition of "purchaser"35 and cannot recover on implied
36

warranty.

23. bro. STAT. ANN. § 58-606 (1961) (cited in Hart v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., supra note 18, at 819).
24. CoNN. GEar. STAT., § 1276e (1939), cited in Duart v. Axton-Cross Co., 19 Conn.
Sup. 188, 110 A.2d 647, 648 (1954), and extending the implied warranty "to all
members of the buyer's household." Cook in the college kitchen was held not be
within the household of the buyer college.
25. U.C.C. § 2-318, quoted supra note 3.
26. See U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3, quoted supra note 17.
27. PnossEn, TORTS § 97, at 683 (3d ed. 1964); Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d
285, (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (employee of retailer who was injured by an exploding beer
bottle was denied recover on implied warranty).
28. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (a), supra note 2.
29. U.C.C. § 2-318, quoted supra note 3.
30. U.C.C. § 2-103, quoted supra note 2.
31. Ibid.
32. U.C.C. § 2-318.
33. Ibid.
34. ibid.
35. "'Purchase' includes taking by sale . . . or any other voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property." U.C.C. § 1-201(32). "'Purchaser' means a person
who takes by purchase." U.C.C. § 1-201(33).
36. The dissent lost contact with the real issue when it placed its emphasis on the
definition of "purchaser," for even if the plaintiff were classified as a purchaser, he
would still be outside the protected category of § 2-318, which refers to "buyers."
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The majority opinion in this case reaches a commendable result,
but the underlying rationale of the decision is open to controversy.
Section 2-103, 7 on which the court placed heavy reliance, is certainly susceptible to two interpretations, and it appears that the court
has misunderstood the definition of "buyer" found in that section.
Correctly analyzed, this definition of "buyer" refers to a person who
has contracted to buy but has not paid for the product, rather than
to an agent of the actual vendee. There are several considerations
which lend weight to this interpretation. First, since the conditional
sales contract or credit financing arrangement is so often employed
in the business world, it seems likely that section 2-103 was intended
to refer to this type of financing procedure, thereby giving the person
who contracts to buy goods for himself the consumer protection of
implied warranty.38 Second, comment 3 to section 2-31839 states
that "the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to
his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain." 4° If the draftsmen of the Code had intended to extend the
implied warranty action to agents who contract to buy goods for their
employers, then this statement of neutrality in comment 3 would
not have been inserted. Third, if the interpretation of section 2-10341
applied in this case were in accord with the intent of the legislature
and the draftsmen of the Code, the extension of the warranty would
have been stated in more explicit terms than the language used in
section 2-103.42 It appears that the majority opinion misapplied section 2-10343 in order to avoid the rigid privity requirement of implied
warranty,4 while still paying lip service to this antiquated doctrine.
Since the Code is neutral on this point,45 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court should have taken the progressive step of disregarding the
privity requirement, rather than trying to hang the case on a questionable, or, at least, a somewhat technical point. A substantial majority
of the text-writers contend that public policy considerations necessi37. U.C.C. § 2-103.
38. The problem arises where the contract to buy has been made, the goods are
delivered but have not been paid for, and the receiver of the goods is injured by a
defective product before the bargain has been consummated.
39. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3.
40. Ibid.
41. U.C.C. § 2-103.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. For cases showing Pennsylvania's adherence to the privity requirement, see
Hocbgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 18; Loch v. Confair, supra note 5.
45. U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3.
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tate additional consumer protection. 46 First, the manufacturer or
producer is in a better position to bear the burden of the risk of injury
to the consumer, because the manufacturer is able to take out liability
insurance and to produce a safer article. The added cost of these
measures can easily be passed on to the vendee by price increases.
Second, without the action in implied warranty, an individual consumer often finds that the process of proving actionable negligence
against a large manufacturer is virtually impossible, as well as prohibitively expensive. 47 Although it is argued that, even where privity
is strictly enforced, the implied warranty action is still available by
ascending the distributive chain from buyer to retailer, retailer to
wholesaler, and wholesaler to manufabturer, 48 this process involves a
multiplicity of litigation, and a break in this chain 49 will leave a negligent manufacturer untouched. A manufacturer who has advertised
the quality and safety of his product should not be allowed to use
the technical requirement of privity as a screen to protect himself
from liability by merely proving that he had made no contract with
the injured party. In states where the courts have persisted in adhering to the strict privity requirement in the face of opposing policy
considerations, the legislatures could remedy the situation by adopting
a statute similar to section 2-318 of the 1949 draft of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which extended the liability of the manufacturer
in implied warranty to "one whose relationship to him [the buyer]
is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods....50
46. PRossEm, TonTs § 97, at 673 (3d ed. 1964); Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has
the Tocsin Sounded, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1963); Prosser, supra note 4; Roberts,
supra note 4.
47. The investigation of massive assembly lines in a large manufacturing plant
in order to prove that a single article was defectively made would be especially
prohibitive when the prospective recovery was not a large sum.
48. See Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, supra note 4, for
these policy considerations.
49. This break can occur by the insolvency of one of the parties, the running of the
statute of limitations, a disclaimer of liability, or by jurisdictional problems. See
PRossER, ToRTs § 97, at 674 (3d ed. 1964).
50. U.C.C. § 2-318 (May 1959 Tentative Draft). (Emphasis added.) See also 2
HARPER & JAmEs, TOnTS § 28.16, at 1572 n.6 (1956).
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State Taxation-Federal Governmental ImmunityUse Tax Levied on Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contractor
Not Violative of Constitutional Immunity
Tennessee collected from Union Carbide and H. K. Ferguson Company a sales and use tax' upon purchases made by them pursuant
to their contract with the Atomic Energy Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the AEC). The companies and the AEC, seeking to
recover these taxes under the concept of governmental immunity,
asserted that the United States was the actual purchaser, and that
the use of the property purchased was not for the companies' commercial benefit, but was a use exclusively for the benefit of the
United States.2 Operating under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee management
contract, Carbide was obligated to manage the AEC installation at
Oak Ridge, with the AEC retaining the right to supervise and issue
major policy directives. A specific function of Carbide was the procurement of supplies and equipment, which it was free to do without
AEC approval in amounts not exceeding 100,000 dollars. 3 Ferguson's
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract required construction services at the
plant. Purchase of essential equipment was handled similar to the
system used by Carbide, except Ferguson was restricted to 10,000
1. The Tennessee sales tax is a tax imposed upon the privileges of selling, leasing,
renting, importing for distribution, storage, use or consumption, and using per se in

the performance or fulfillment of a contract tangible personal property. TENN. CODE§ 67-3000 (Supp. 1963). Whereas the original Tennessee sales tax was a
typical sales tax embodying the conventional complementary use tax designed to
reach goods imported from without the state, the statute was amended in 1955 to
cover all use of tangible personal property within the state where no tax had previously
been paid on the property, irrespective of ownership of the property, and including
specifically use by a contractor in the fulfillment of his contract obligations. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-3004 (Supp. 1963). See also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-3002, 3003,
3008, 3012 (Supp. 1964).
2. Carbide was a litigant in an earlier case with the Tennessee Department of
Revenue, wherein it contended that it was not subject to Tennessee sales and use
taxes. Its claim was based on two premises: (1) that it was an agent of the United
States, and (2) that section 9(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, 60 Stat. 765 (1946),
afforded statutory exemption. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held in Carbide and
Carbon Chemical Corp. v. Carson, 192 Tenn. 150, 239 S.W.2d. 27 (1951), that
Carbide was not an agent but an independent contractor, but that it was exempt under
section 9(b). The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. Carson v. RoaneAnderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952). In 1953 Congress repealed the language of
section 9(b). 67 Stat. 575 (1953).
3. The following is included among the terms and conditions attached to the order
forms: "It is understood and agreed that the Order is entered into by the Company
for and on behalf of the Government; that title to all supplies furnished hereunder
by the Seller shall pass directly from the Seller to the Government, as purchaser, at
the point of delivery; that the Company is authorized to and will make payment hereunder from Government funds advanced and agreed to be advanced to it by the
ANN.

Commission . . ." United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 42 n.4.
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dollars without approval. 4 In the trial court the chancellor entered

a decree holding the companies liable for the sales and use taxes.
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to the sales tax,5
but sustained the collection of the contractors' use tax on the theory
that the companies were independent contractors. 6 Considering only
the validity of the use tax, the United States Supreme Court, affirming

the Tennessee court, held the tax was not levied directly upon the
government, but levied upon the companies' private use, and was
therefore not violative of the constitutional immunity of the United
States. United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).

State sales and use taxes are subject to restrictions imposed by the
Constitution. One of those restrictions, although not explicit in the

Constitution, is governmental immunity. Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland' declared that federal instrumentalities were

by constitutional implication immune from state taxation, for such
taxation, if allowed, would work a disparagement of national sov-

ereignty. From this premise developed the concept that states were
prohibited from levying a tax, the economic burden of which was
borne by the federal government.8 Once crystallized, the doctrine
of governmental immunity was applied with indistinguishable rigidity,
and it foreclosed to the states for approximately one-hundred years

revenue from any transaction to which the Government was a
party.9 The economic and social adjustments of the 1930's, requiring

increased governmental activities, caused the states to enact general
sales taxes to meet the demands for increased expenditures. With the
purchasing power of the nation supported by federal work programs,
the states viewed these projects as a lucrative source of revenue. 10

James v. Dravo Contracting Co." presented the issue of whether state
4. See note 3 supra.
5. United States v. Boyd, 211 Tenn. 139, 363 S.W.2d 193 (1962). Relying on KernLimerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954), the court determined that Carbide
and Ferguson acted only as purchasing agents, and that the United States was the
actual purchaser.
6. Id. at 204.
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
8. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
9. For cases dealing with state tax upon telegraph companies, see Williams v. Talladega, 226 U.S. 404 (1912); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882); Pensacola
Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878). For cases dealing with state
tax upon gasoline see Graves v. Texas, 298 U.S. 393 (1936); Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928). See also, Rice & Estes, Sales and Use
Tax as Affected by Federal Governmental Immunity, 9 VmND. L. REv. 204, 207-11
(1956).
10. Rice & Estes, supra note 9, at 211.
11. 302 U.S. 134 (1937). It overruled no prior decisions, but attempted rather to
distinguish Telegraph Co. v. Texas and Williams v. Talladega, supra note 9, and
dismissed the cases of Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex sel Knox and Graves v.
Texas Co., supra note 9, as limited to their particular facts.
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taxation of contractors involved in these projects was an intrusion
upon federal immunity. A West Virginia sales tax upon a contractor
engaged in constructing a dam for the United States was upheld as
a tax not upon the Government or its property, but upon an independent contractor.12 The advent of the Second World War and the
attendant dependence of the Government upon private contractors
again raised the immunity question. Two cases asserting immunity

from Alabama tax, Alabama v. King & Boozer,13 involving the sales

tax, and Curry v. United States,14 involving the use tax, were con-

cluded in favor of the state's right to tax. The Court declared that
the Government was not the purchaser and reasoned that "the Con-

stitution without implementation by Congressional legislation, does
not forbid a tax upon Government contractors because its burden is
passed on economically by the terms of the contract or otherwise
as a part of the construction cost to the Government." 5 In place of

the economic burden test, the Court espoused the legal incidence
test: if the legal incidence of the state tax is directly upon the United
States, it is violative of the federal government's immunity; if the
Government is only indirectly affected through increased cost of
materials or services, the tax is valid.' 6 The states' victory as represented by this criterion emphasizing form rather than substance was
lessened by Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,'7 a case factually similar
to King & Boozer.'8 The important distinction was that the KernLimerick contract labeled the contractor as a purchasing agent for
the United States, with the United States directly liable to the vendor
for the cost and with the title vesting immediately in the United
States. 19 Holding the purchase to have been made by an authorized
agent of the United States, the Court viewed the transaction as constitutionally immune from sales taxation.20 The case is significant
because of its recognition of the concept of "contract agency." Logically, the decision represented not an overruling of King & Boozer,21
but a corollary to it, with the states feeling the adverse effects of
12. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
13. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
14. 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
15. Id. at 18.
16. For application of the legal incidence test see Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans,
345 U.S. 495 (1953); United States v. Alleghney County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
See also, Rice & Estes, supra note 9, at 214.
17. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
18. Supra note 13.
19. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, supra note 17, at 112 n.2. The contract was
entered into by the Department of the Navy pursuant to sections 2(c) (10) and 4(b)
of the Armed Services Procurement Act, 62 Stat. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
20. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, supranote 17, at 122.
21. Supra note 13; Rice & Estes, supra note 9, at 218-21.
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the criterion.22 To counteract this effect, several states amended their
sales tax statutes, imposing tax liability on property used in the
performance of a contract, regardless of the immunity of the title
holderP' Concluding the existing authority are three decisions involving a Michigan statute which provided that when tax exempt
realty is used by a private party conducting a business for profit,
that party is subject to taxation to the same extent as though he
owned the property.24 In United States v. Detroit25 the taxpayer, a
lessee of a government owned plant, used the property for his private
benefit. The Court held that the tax was not on the property, but
on the lessee's use of the property in a private business. 2 The same
result was reached in United States v. Muskegon,7 where the taxpayer was utilizing government property under a formal permit
while in performance of a contract with the Government. The same
statute 28 provides that owners or persons in possession of personal
property shall pay all taxes assessed thereon. In Detroitv. Murray,29
the taxpayer was operating under a government contract by which
title to all parts and materials was in the United States. The Court
viewed the tax as imposing a levy on a private party possessing government property, which it was using in the conduct of its own
business6 0
31
The Court in the instant case accepted the principles of Boozer,
Curry,32 Esso,-' and Muskegon3 4 as providing the proper balance
between the interest of the state to tax and the interest of the United
States to be free from taxation. Alteration of these principles the
Court found not to be its responsibility, but that of Congress. 3 As
to the applicability of these principles to the instant case, the Court
established as the vital consideration the fact that Carbide and
Ferguson were using the property for their own commercial benefit
as part of their regular business activities. It is this use for private
22. Rice & Estes, supra note 9, at 218-21.
23. CAL. Bsv. & TAx. CODE ANN. § 6384; GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3448 (a) (Cum.
Supp. 1955); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1361.1 (Cum. Supp. 1955); TENN. CODE ANN. §
67-3004 (1956).
24. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.7 (5), (6) (Supp. 1957).
25. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
26. Id. at 469.
27. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
28. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.1, -.10, -.81 (1950).
29. 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
30. Id. at 493.
31. Supra note 13.
32. Supra note 14.
33. Supra note 16.
34. Supra note 27.
35. United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 51 (1964).
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ends that the Court marked as a separate and taxable activity.36
Rejecting the Government's application of the Muskegon dictum 7
to the present facts, the Court concluded that the companies had not
become so incorporated within the governmental structure as to be
constituent parts, with the benefit the Government's, and the legal
incidence of the tax on the Government. In reaching this conclusion
the Court reasoned that at the inception of the operation, the AEC,
by authorization of Congress, chose to perform its functions by con38
tract with private industry, rather than by using its own personnel.
As a last consideration the Court rejected the time-worn argument
that future government costs would be substantially increased. Replying that Congress, aware that "constitutional immunity does not
extend to cost-plus-fixed-fee contractors of the Federal Government,
39
but is limited to taxes imposed directly upon the United States,"
repealed section 9(b )40 with the declared intent to make the activity
41
taxable.
The decision in the instant case is significant in two regards. First,
as an immediate practical consideration, AEC contractors, previously
granted statutory immunity42 from state taxation, are placed in the
same position as all other government contractors. Of greater significance, however, is the resulting contraction of the immunity area,
and a further isolation of Kern-Limerick.43 The opinion, though terse,
reveals a categorical affirmance of the King & Boozer legal incidence
test,44 with the measure of "benefit" to the contractor serving as an
additional determining factor. The present victory for state tax
administrators may, however, prove to be an illusory one. Although
in the instant case the contractors' relationship with the Government
presented an appearance of incorporation within the governmental
structure, it was far less than the formal declaration of agency in the
Kern-Limerick contract.4 5 Remaining for speculation is a factual situation presenting the Kern-Limerick form, but with substantial commercial benefits accruing to the contractor. A future Court might
36. Id. at 45. Compare Livingston v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 9. (E.D.S.C. 1959),
aff'd per curiam, 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
37. The Court remarked that, "The case might well be different if the Government
bad reserved such control over the activities and financial gain of Continental that it
could properly be called a 'servant' of the United States in agency terms." United States
v. Muskegon, supra note 27, at 486.
38. Supra note 35, at 47.
39. S. REP. No. 694, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953).
40. 67 Stat. 575 (1953). See note 2 supra.
41. Supra note 35, at 50.
42. 60 Stat. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (1958).
43. Supra note 17.
44. Alabama v. King & Boozer, supra note 13.
45. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, supra note 17, at 112 n.2.
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well look through the present decision, distinguish it on its facts,
and find no commitment to disregard the Kern-Limerick "contract
agency" principle.46 What is perhaps more likely is that a future
Court, on finding some minimum amount of initiative and independent responsibility left to the contractor, will hold to the commitment here established; that commercial benefit is the decisive factor
in the application of the legal incidence test, regardless of a formal
declaration or attempted construction of an agency relationship.
Though the merits and demerits of affording tax immunity to government contractors are asserted vigorously by the respective interest
groups the Court's attitude here of allowing state taxation reflects
a proper appreciation of the policy considerations. Federal agencies
faced with budgetary commands and taxpayer demands for maximum
utilization of tax dollars are naturally reluctant to pay allocated funds
indirectly to the states. But if the absence of immunity deprives the
federal government of maximum use of its money, immunity deprives
the states of a substantial tax loss that they cannot afford to lose.
Exceptions and exclusions to a tax base produce administrative complications, which provide increased opportunities for concealable
taxable transactions. From the standpoint of constitutional theory
the primary objection to the granting of tax immunity to contractors
with the government is that private commercial concerns are thereby
cloaked with federal sovereignty in derogation of state sovereignty.47
Whatever the view may be as to the merits and demerits of immunity,
for the present the limits remain prescribed by the legal incidence
test. In the absence of a formal declaration of agency as existed in
Kern-Limerick, 48 the states can tax those contractors who purchase
Dr use the property for their own private commercial benefit.
46. Ibid.
47. Rice & Estes, supra note 9, at 218.
48. Supra note 17.
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Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Wage Continuation
Payment Not Excludable From Employee's Gross
Income Where Payment Discretionary With
Management
Taxpayer was absent from work on account of illness for a period
of sixteen weeks.1 During this period, pursuant to a "general practice,"2 but at the discretion of the management, the company continued to pay the taxpayer's salary. On his income tax return for
1960, taxpayer excluded from gross income 1,600 dollars, representing pay received over this sixteen-week period, as payments made
to him pursuant to a "wage continuation plan" under section 105(d)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.3 The Commissioner disallowed the exclusion and assessed a tax deficiency. On petition to
the Tax Court of the United States, held, the exclusion was properly
disallowed because the payments, being discretionary with the management, were not made pursuant to a "plan" within the meaning of
section 105(e). 4 John C. Lang, 41 T.C. 352 (1963).
Prior to 1954, when the word "insurance" was part of the Code
but the word "plan" was not,5 there was concern as to how far the
definition of insurance could be expanded to allow employees to
exclude from income payments from an employer's plan to benefit
sick employees. 6 For these health payments to be excludable, the
1. The government contended that the taxpayer was "absent" from work for a
period of only about six weeks, after which time he was allowed by his doctor to
return to work for only about two hours -a day. Taxpayer did not resume full
activities for a total of sixteen weeks.
2. John C. Lang, 41 T.C. 352, 353 (1963).
3. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 105(a), "Except as otherwise provided in this section,
amounts received by an employee through accident or health insurance for personal
injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the extent such amounts
(1) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible in
the gross income of the employee, or (2) are paid by the employer . . . . (d) Wage
continuation plans.-Gross income does not include amounts referred to in subsection
(a) if such amounts constitute wages or payments in lieu of wages for a period during
which the employee is absent from work on account of personal injuries or sickness;
but this subsection shall not apply to the extent that such amounts exceed a weekly
rate of $100."
4. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 105(e), "Accident and Health Plans.-For purposes
of this section...
(1) amounts received under an accident or health plan for employees
shall be treated as amounts received through accident or health insurance." A "plan"
under subsection (e) merely places it in the same category as "insurance" in subsection (a). Being then in the same category as insurance in subsection (a), payments
under the plan become excludible under subsection (d).
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(b) (5), 53 Stat. 10: the forerunner of sections
104 and 105 of the 1954 Code. Under the 1939 Code, health and accident insurance
payments were excluded without qualification.
6. Schlenger, Disability Benefits Under Section 22(b)(5), 40 VA. L. REv. 549, 565-81
(1954.)
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plan under which they were paid had to meet the formalities of an
insurance contract. These formalities-basically the payment of premiums and enforceability-were held to be satisfied by the mutual
obligations of employer and employee in the employment contract
itself.7 It was held that a non-commercial, non-premium, solely intracompany health plan could be considered insurance. 8 The Treasury
continued to advocate an insurance-like definition of a health plan,
requiring an independent fund for employee contributions,9 an upper
limit on the amount the employee could receive, and a period of
payments not dependent on an employee's length of service. 10 Nevertheless, the scope of health plans under the 1939 Code was broadened
and such plans could qualify even though not utilizing an independent
fund or prospective employment as premium consideration." Even
plans covering only one employee could qualify, 2 but that employee
had to have either actual or constructive knowledge of such a plan
before his illness. 13 Plans could even be voluntary and non-contractual
and still qualify.14 With the advent of the 1954 Code, however, it
had to be determined whether the case-by-case interpretation of the
1939 Code as to what constituted a plan could be carried over into
the specific language of the 1954 statute. At the outset, more than
7. Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952).
8. Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81 (1957).
9. Under the 1939 Code, the Treasury tried to differentiate between employer- and
employee-funded accident and health insurance, but the broad term "insurance" precluded this dichotomy. Under the 1954 code, insurance still remains excludible from
income under § 104(a) except to the extent paid for by the employer under § 105(a).
Section 105(d) is an exception to the employer payment provision, so the dichotomy
has been only partially perfected. See Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 222, 227-28 (1954).
10. Gornick, The 1954 Internal Revenue Code: Sick Pay, Meals, Lodging, Salesmen's
Expenses, 41 A.B.A.J. 612 (1955). Even when the 1954 Code brought in section
105, it was at first thought that a health plan had to be contractual and thus
enforceable like insurance. See Epmeier v. United States, supra note 7. H. R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954). But see H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A 33-34 (1954): "All of the employees covered by the plan must have an
enforceable right to the compensation covered under the plan during the period
when the plan remains in effect. Under this rule any employee who is covered
by the plan during such period must have a non-forfeitable right to the benefits
which are provided by the plan, i.e., his rights to receive the benefits may not
depend on the whim of the employer. However, the term enforceable is not used
in an absolute sense . . : ." (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, it has been thought
that any practicable plan must be under commercial insurance and thus contractual since employers might find themselves subject to insurance regulations under
state law if they tried to act as their own insurer. Pyle, Accident and Sickness,
Insurance Under Sections 104, 105, 106 and 213 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,
1956 IN s. L.J. 51, 56.
11. Kuhn v. United States, 258 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1958).
12. Ibid.
13. Charles J. Jackson, 28 T.C. 36 (1957); J. Wesley Sibole, 28 T.C. 40 (1957).
14. Branham v. United States, 245 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1957), reversing per curiam
136 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Ky. 1955)
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one ad hoc payment was felt to be necessary to constitute a plan.15
However, it would seem that discriminatory plans in favor of one
or more employees were intended to be acceptable. 16 The regulations attempted to apply with more clarity essentially the same qualifying factors that were necessary for a health plan to be considered
"insurance" under the 1939 Code's case law.17 The leading case under
the 1954 Code, Estate of Leo P. Kaufman,8 held that the continued

compensation to a sick employee, made on an ad hoc basis, was not
excludable under section 105(d), even though it was the company's
policy to pay sick employees. Hence the basic requirements of
either knowledge of a pre-existing method for dispensing sickness
benefits or an enforceable insurance-like contract, as under the 1939
Code, remained limitations on any liberal interpretation of accident
or health "plan."19 One reason for exacting the rigid requirement

of a pre-existing plan may stem from the policy behind inclusion of
payments from employer-contributed funds under section 105(a),

i.e., the preclusion of the possibility that an employer, at his own
whim, could send a high salaried executive-stockholder to Florida on

compensated, tax-free "sick leave."20

In the instant case, the Tax Court relied heavily on its factual finding that the "general practice" of the company in paying sick employees offered no "definite expectation" to the petitioner that he
15. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1954); Comment, supra note 9,
at 231. But see Andress v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 371 (1961).
16. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1954); Rev. Rul. 58-90, 1958-1
Ctmr. BULL. 88; Pyle, supra note 11, at 59. The Senate Finance Committee report's
deletion of the House requirement for qualification was said to be to eliminate the
requirement that plans be non-discriminatory. Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 222, 234 n.79.
This idea is probably based on the Committee's stated desire to steer away from the
possible analogy to qualified pension, profit-sharing and stock bonus plans under
§ 401 of the Code-one of the requirements for qualification thereunder being that
the plan be non-discriminatory. It was feared that if the qualification requirement
were kept in § 105, each plan would have to be submitted for an administrative ruling.
17. "In general, an accident or health plan is an arrangement for the payment of
amounts to employees in the event of personal injuries or sickness. A plan may cover
one or more employees, and there may be different plans for different employees or
classes of employees. . . . [I]t is not necessary that the plan be in writing or that
the employee's rights to benefits under the plan be enforceable. However, if the
employee's rights are not enforceable, an amount will be deemed to be received
under a plan only if, on the date the employee became sick or injured, the employee
was covered by a plan (or a program, policy or custom having the effect of a plan) ...
and notice or knowledge of such a plan was reasonably available to the employee.
It is immaterial who makes payment of the benefits provided by the plan." Treas.
Reg. § 1.105-5 (1956). But see Pyle, supra note 11, at 60, where the author doubts,
in the light of the whole of § 105, that the Regulations mean what they say when
it is stated that a plan need not be enforceable.
18. 35 T.C. 663 (1961).
19. Accord, Chism's Estate v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963).
20. Brrrn, FEDmAL INcoME, ESTATE, AND G=-T TAxAioN 147 (1958).
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would receive continued salary if he became sick.2 ' The expectation
was nothing more than an anticipation of the favorable exercise of
discretion by the employer when the sickness arises.22 Since, then,
there was no definite pre-determined course of action, the case
presented a question of simply ad hoc benefit payments and was
controlled, thought the court, by the Kaufman case.23 It should be
noted that by stipulation there was no issue whether the payments
made to the taxpayer in this case came under an insurance arrangement as such,24 which obviated the problem of whether insurance
existed within the meaning of section 105(a).
Since the Regulations do not require that there be a "definite
expectation" of payments any more than they require the plan to be
enforceable, it is doubtful whether the court was correct in using
this criterion to determine whether compensation should qualify
for exclusion as being made under an "accident or health plan."
A plan could stipulate that on occurrence of certain contingencies
after the employee became sick, he would be denied payments; on
the date he became sick, his expectations of payments are then indefinite and yet under the regulations he is still "covered by a plan"
and entitled to an income exclusion if he receives payments. Even if
the holding is well grounded, the case calls attention to a basic question of tax policy-is there really any need for a pre-existing benefit
plan in order to fulfill the policy of easing the burden of illness expenses by permitting offsetting income to be free from tax? What
dangers of misuse of this legislative grace will be avoided by requiring
a specific plan, known to the employee beforehand? The danger of
approving tax-free "sick leave" in Florida at the employer's whim is5
largely avoided by the regulations, which prohibit such a practice
and revenue rulings which make actual facts, rather than the employer's determinations, final on the question whether or not an employee
is sick.2 6 However, with the retention of the present requirement of a
plan, especially since such plans may discriminate in favor of particular
employees, there is a favorable loophole available for semi-retired incapacitated employees, which may not have been foreseen by the
21. John C. Lang, 41 T.C. 352, 357 (1963).
22. Id. at 356.
23. The Kaufnan case may be distinquishable from the instant case since there the
employee still continued in service as a consultant. These consulting services may have
been the main reason for continued payment. 2 RmIwIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcoAM,
G= Am EsTATE TAxATIoN § 14.12(5), at 1489 (1962).
24. 41 T.C. at 355.
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-4(a)(3) (i), (ii) (1956).
26. See citations in 1 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 7.31, at 78

(1962). For a case dealing with the situation where an employer did not follow his
own intra-company regulations, see Hall v. United States, 242 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1958).
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drafters of section 105.27 Such an employee who is used for consulting
duties only may receive "pension" salary up until retirement age28
under a wage continuation plan and have it tax exempt; otherwise, if
it were a regular pension, it would have to qualify as a non-discriminatory plan under section 401 before it could get any favorable deferred income treatment-present current deduction treatment.29 To
qualify for this pre-retirement tax exemption, the employee must nevertheless receive his "pension" under a "plan" for the purposes of section
105(d) and (e).30 Perhaps, then, any revamping of the requirement
of wage continuation plans under section 105 might follow these
lines: (1) an elimination of the requirement of a pre-existing plan
where the employee is legitimately sick 3' and unable to be of any
service to an employer, as in the present case; but (2) a retention of
the necessity for a pre-existing plan, which may have to qualify
beforehand with the Treasury to prevent abuses in retirement age
discrepancies, where a semi-retired, pension arrangement is desired.

Torts-Duty Owed Property Owners by Private
Water Company Contracting With Municipality

To Provide Water for Fire Hydrants
The plaintiffs' home was destroyed by a fire which the municipal
fire department could have contained but for the failure of the water
supply from nearby fire hydrants. The homeowners brought an action
ex delicto for damages against the water company, which had contracted with the municipality to furnish water to hydrants for fire
extinguishment purposes, charging the company with negligence in
27. Comment, 4 VmLr. L. REv. 567, 571-75 (1959).
28. Rev. Rul. 57-76, 1957-1 Curm. Butt.. 66, discusses what determines retirement
age. A particular employee may under certain circumstances reach "retirement" age
later than employees who are subject to pension plans which get special favorable
treatment only if they are qualified under section 401.
29. See note 28 supra. The favorable treatment of sections 402 and 404 which
grant current deductions of employer contributions and deferred income for employee
until he retires are still not as favorable as having in addition, up to the maximum
retirement age, as much as $5200 exempted from annual income. The Kuhn case, supra
note 11, indicates that this may be possible at least for a man up to age 66. Accord,
Jackson v. United States, 59-1 U.S. Tax Gas. ff 9171 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 1958)
(though designated a "pension" on employer's books, payments were nevertheless
held to be made under a wage continuation plan).
30. Hall v. United States, supra note 26; Estate of Leo P. Kaufman, supra note 18.
31. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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the maintenance' of its water system. The Court of Common Pleas
of Allegheny County dismissed the case for failure to state a cause
of action. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held,
reversed. A water company which contracts with a municipality to
provide water for fire hydrants is under a duty to property owners
to perform its contractual duties with due care, since it is foreseeable
that negligence in the performance of these duties may cause damage
to the property owner. Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 199

A.2d 875 (Pa. 1964).
Where there is no direct contractual relationship between the
property owner and the water company, the overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions have held that the property owner cannot maintain
an action ex delicto2 against the water company to recover damages
for a fire loss, even though the loss was sustained by reason of the
water company's negligent failure to provide water as required by
its contract with the municipality. 3 The "classic" 4 statement in support
of this majority position is the unanimous decision by the New York
Court of Appeals in H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,5 in
which Judge Cardozo wrote the opinion. The decision, sustaining
the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint for failure to
state a cause of action,6 based its conclusions on the following reasons,
which have been generally expressed in support of the rule denying
recovery: (1) the relationship between the parties is such that the
water company's conduct in failing to perform its contract with the
municipality, "a mere negligent omission," results only in denying to
the plaintiff a benefit he might otherwise receive as distinguished
1. "The Complaint states that the defendant allowed the water in the crucial
hydrants to freeze so that they became useless for fire-fighting emergencies; that it
failed to inspect the hydrants, failed to maintain sufficient pressure in the hydrants,
failed to replace or repair inoperative valves and, inter alia, failed to notify the
plaintiffs or the Pittsburgh Fire Department that the hydrants were inoperative."
Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 199 A.2d 875, 876 (Pa. 1964).
2. The majority of jurisdictions here similarly denied the plaintiff the right to sue
ex contractu as a third party beneficiary of the contract between the water company
and the municipality, generally concluding that the property owner is a mere incidental
beneficiary to the contract. 56 Am. Jun. Waterworks §§ 65, 66 (1947); 94 C.J.S.
Waters § 310 (1956).
3. 56 Am. JuR. Waterworks § 67 (1947); 94 C.J.S. Waters § 310 (1956). See also
Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1205 (1929),

which cites decisions from twenty jurisdictions, in-

cluding Pennsylvania, following this rule.
4. In Luis v. Orcutt Town Water Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 433, 446 (1962), the court

follows H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., infra note 5, referring to the
decision as "the classic case."
5. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
6. The complaint charged that the water company had "omitted and neglected
after such notice, to supply or furnish sufficient or adequate quantity of water, with
adequate pressure .. " Id. at 163, 159 N.E. at 896.
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from the inflicting of a tortious injury; 7 (2) the imposition of liability
upon the water company for such failure would be an objectionable
policy because it would constitute an "undue extension of the zone

of duty;" 8 (3) the relevant state statute, which is applicable to all
public service corporations and makes it the duty of a water company "to furnish water, upon demand by the inhabitants, at reasonable
rates, through suitable connections," is held to evidence no intention
to enlarge the water company's zone of liability where an inhabitant
suffers "indirect or incidental" damageY A further reason frequently
expressed in support of the majority position is that the water company, as the agent of the municipality, shares the governmental

immunity with which the municipality would be clothed were it to
perform the service of providing water. 10 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had previously adopted this reason in denying a property owner recovery." A minority of two jurisdictions' 2 have considered unsound the conclusion that a property owner has no right
of action in tort against a water company that has negligently
breached its contract with the municipality. A similar result has also

been reached in Kentucky by recognizing a right in the property
owner to sue as a third party beneficiary of the contract between the

water company and the municipality. 13 However, this small minority
7. Id. at 168, 159 N.E. at 898-99. Dean Prosser describes the decisions that
follow the majority rule as those in the law of torts in which "the nonfeasance line"
has been most sharply drawn. PRossFR, ToRTs § 99 (3d ed. 1964).
8. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. at 168, 159 N.E. at 899. The
view has been frequently expressed that the rates for water are set to compensate the
water company for providing water as a commodity only. For example, in Atlas
Finishing Co. v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1197, 163 Ad. 20, 22 (Sup.
Ct. 1932), the court concluded that, "in the nature of things, the compensation fixed
by the supervising state agency has no relation to the assumption of any such
liability; that compensation is based on the expense of furnishing water simply as a
commodity .. "
9. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. at 169, 170, 159 N.E. at 899.
10. The United States Supreme Court approved this argument in the following
language: "But the city was under no legal obligation to furnish the water; and if
it voluntarily undertook to do more than the law required, it did not thereby subject
itself to a new or greater liability. It acted in a governmental capacity, and was no
more responsible for failure in that respect than it would have been for failure to
furnish adequate police protection.
"If the common law did not impose such duty upon a public corporation, neither
did it require private companies to furnish fire protection to property reached by
their pipes." German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 22728 (1912).
11. Thompson v. Springfield Water Co., 215 Pa. 275, 64 At. 521 (1906).
12. The jurisdictions recognizing a right to recovery in tort are Florida and North
Carolina. See, e.g., Woodbury v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 57 Fla. 243, 49 So. 556
(1009); Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 128 N.C. 375, 38 S.E. 912 (1901).
13. See Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, 12 S.W.
554 (1889). This jurisdiction has, however, refused to hold the water company liable
in tort. "It will be noted that our court is in the minority in holding to the rule that
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of three has been joined in its condemnation of the prevailing rule by
the near unanimous voice of the legal authorities that have considered
the question. 14 The jurisdictions that have held water companies
liable in tort for their negligence have differed as to the exact nature
of the duty which has been breached. The Supreme Court of Florida
has emphasized the water company's privileged status as a public
service monopoly and concluded that a public duty of care is incumbent upon one in such a favored position.'5 In North Carolina
it has been held that when a water company undertakes to provide
water to a community it thereby assumes the obligation of using due
care in the performance of its undertaking. 16 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized the minority view as a tenable conclusion and followed an applicable decision by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in which the water company had been held liable.,
However, the Court subsequently approved the majority rule, when
considering the question "as [a] matter of general law."18
a water company is liable for loss resulting from failure to perform its contract to
furnish water for fire protection. . . . While adhering to the minority rule, we are
not prepared to carry it to the extent of holding the company liable for a common-law
tort." Clay v. Catlettsburg, Kenova & Credo Water Co., 301 Ky. 456, 457, 192 S.W.2d
358, 359 (1946).
14. See, e.g., Seavey, Reliance On Gratuitous Promises Or Other Conduct, 64 HAhv.
L. REV. 913 (1951), in which Judge Cardozo's opinion in H. R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., supra note 5, is described as "perhaps his most unsatisfactory
opinion in the field of torts ..
" Seavey, supra at 920-21. See also Corbin, Liability
of Water Companies for Losses by Fire, 19 YALE L.J. 425 (1909); Sunderland, The
Liability of Water Companies for Fire Losses, 3 MIcH. L. REv. 442 (1905). The
only legal writing contra is Kales, Liability Of Water Companies For Fire LossesAnother View, 3 MIcH. L. REv. 501 (1905).
15. See, e.g., Muggee v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 52 Fla. 371, 42 So. 81 (1906), in
which the Supreme Court of Florida said that "We are of the opinion that the
defendant in error, enjoying, as it does, extensive franchises and privileges under its
contract . . . has assumed the public duty of furnishing water for extinguishing fires,
according to the terms of its contract .... ." Id. at 388, 42 So. at 86.
16. See, e.g., Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., supra note 12, at 376, 38
S.E. at 913, holding that a complaint which charged the water company with "breach
of the duties, obligations, and responsibilities which it assumed when it undertook to
supply water for a stipulated price," sufficiently stated a cause of action ex delicto.
17. In determining whether a claim against a water company filed in a bankruptcy
proceeding in North Carolina was a preferred tort claim or a general contract claim,
the Court followed the state court's interpretation, and held: "From the conclusion
thus reached [by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Fisher v. Greensboro
Water Supply Co., supra note 12] we are not inclined to dissent and for these
reasons. One may acquire by contract an opportunity for acts and conduct in which
parties other than those with whom he contracts are interested and for negligence in
which he is liable in damages to such other parties." Guardian Trust & Deposit Co.
v. Fisher, 200 U.S. 57, 67 (1906).
18. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., supra note 10. There
was no settled applicable state law at the time the action was begun in the district
court, and the Supreme Court, therefore, accepted the plaintiff's contention that "the
Federal courts must decide for themselves, as matter of general law, the much controverted question as to a water company's liability.
... Id. at 227.
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The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Doyle v.
South Pittsburgh Water Co.'9 seemingly aligns that jurisdiction with
the minority position discussed above. Judge Musmanno, writing for
the court, proceeds carefully but forcefully to develop the arguments
in support of imposing liability upon the water company, while
attacking the well-established reasons upon which the majority rule
is based, especially Judge Cardozo's reasoning in H. R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co. 20 The first of the defendant water company's
arguments to be considered and rejected was that the destruction of
the plaintiffs' homes was proximately caused by the fire itself, the
lack of water being, at most a remote cause of the damage. The
court held that the fire, although an intervening cause, was a foreseeable factor, and, therefore, one against which the water company
was under a duty to guard. 21 Moreover, the issue of causation was
considered one for jury determination. 22 The next issue for consideration was the question of the existence and nature of the duty
owed the property owners by the water company. Judge Musmanno
concluded that the factual context of the case placed it squarely
within the principle of liability enunciated in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., a landmark decision in the law of products liability.
The Buick Motor Company was held to owe to the ultimate consumer
of its product a duty of care in manufacturing the product, because it
knew or had reason to know that persons other than the immediate
purchaser would use the product and that such use would be without
further inspection.24 The court in the instant case analogized that the
water company, which had reason to know that its service was to
be used by the inhabitants of the community in reliance upon the
company's care in establishing and maintaining the water system,
19. Supra note 1.
20. Supra note 5.
21. "It would be wholly unrealistic to say that the water company was not to
anticipate the likelihood of a fire, in which event its failing to keep the hydrants and

their appurtenances in proper repair could result in the very loss which occurred and
in the very manner it occurred." Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., supra note
1, at 877.
22. Ibid.

23. "The physical situation in the case at bar and the facts evolving therefrom bring
this litigation squarely within the rule that where a party to a contract assumes a duty
to the other party to the contract, and it is foreseeable that a breach of that duty will
cause injury to some third person not a party to the contract, the contracting party

owes a duty to all those falling within the foreseeable orbit of risk of harm." Id. at 878.
24. "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and

limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives
warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is
added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
and used without new tests, then, irrespective of a contract, the manufacturer of this
thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully." MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
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owed a similar duty of care to the ultimate consumer of its se-vice. 5

After relying upon the rule in MacPherson26 as the basis of the duty
owed by the water company, it was nearly imperative that the opinion
deal specifically with H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,27 in
which Judge Cardozo had refused to apply the principle of liability
which he had expressed earlier in MacPherson.28 The court first at-

tempted to distinguish the case under consideration on the ground that
the plaintiff had charged specific acts of negligence, whereas the com-

plaint in H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.

9

had charged the

water company merely with failure to perform its contract with the
municipality. 0 Moreover, Judge Musmanno considered the result in
Moch 3 ' erroneous even on the facts there alleged. Once Judge

Cardozo had admitted that the water company's conduct constituted
a negligent omission,32 it was then inconsistent with the rule in

MacPherson to conclude that such conduct was not tortious because
it merely failed to bestow a benefit. According to the MacPhersonP

principle, Judge Musmanno contended, the refusal to bestow a
benefit may in itself result in such refusal becoming an instrument of
harm.5 The policy argument against imposing liability on the ground

that to do so would place an unbearable financial burden upon the
water company was regarded as unjustifiable fear,36 and an insignifi25. "To erect fire hydrants close to dwellings is to assure the inhabitants of those
homes that potential fire engines stand guard to fight an invading conflagration. To
erect fire hydrants and then not inspect them with some reasonable regularity is like
setting sentinels and then offering them no relief or food so that they fall over from
exhaustion and thereby become useless as watchful guardians. .... Could there be a
greater lapse of care than to fail to properly inspect and maintain fire hydrants once
they have been established and the community has accepted them as being live
guardians and not mere painted cast iron?" Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co.,
supra note 1, at 878-79.
26. Supra note 24.
27. Supra note 5.
28. Supra note 24.
29. Supra note 5.
30. "It is to be particularly noted in that case that in its complaint the plaintiff
alleged that the water company failed to 'fulfill the provisions of the contract between
it and the city of Rensselaer.'. . . No breach of any duty to use reasonable care in the
erection, operation and maintenance of the water system was alleged or relied upon."
Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., supranote 1, at 881.
31. Supra note 5.
32. See note 7 supra.
33. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 24.
34. Ibid.
35. Justice Musmanno continued: "It will be recalled that Justice Cardozo said
in the MacPherson case: '[T]he presence of a known danger, attendant upon a known
use, makes vigilance a duty. . . . We have put the source of the obligation where
it ought to be. We have put its source in the law."' Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water
Co., supra note 1, at 882.
36. "Throughout the entire history of the law, legal Jeremiabs have moaned that
if financial responsibility were imposed in the accomplishment of certain enterprises,
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cant consideration when the grossness of the water company's negligence was considered.3 7 The final obstacle to imposing liability
considered was the contention that the water company was clothed
with immunity since it was performing a governmental function on
behalf of the municipality. It was held that on the facts, a finding
that the water company was an independent contractor could be
supported, in which case the municipality's sovereign immunity, if
such existed, would not be imputed to the water company. 38 The
broad reasoning found in Judge Musmanno's opinion for the court
was, however, acceptable to only one other judge. In a very brief
opinion, two of the six judges considering the case concurred in the
result because "the complaint alleges negligence in the failure to
inspect hydrants and to replace or repair inoperative valves and in
allowing the water in the hydrants to freeze."39 The two remaining
4 in an opinion that reiterated most of the arguments
judges dissented"
against liability that are presented in the previous discussion of the
majority rule. The dissent placed a particular emphasis on the theory
of imputed sovereign immunity.4 '
The Doyle42 decision will probably have fewer direct effects upon
the question of liability in this area than might be expected from a
decision of a prominent and respected court. Judge Musmanno's
reasoning, while sufficiently broad to admit of application in a wide
variety of factual situations, was approved by only one of the other
six judges considering the case. This leads one to wonder what the
same court would do in a case where the negligence charged to the
water company is more clearly nonfeasance. 4 3 Nevertheless, Judge
Musmanno's opinion is a well-reasoned presentation of the arguments
favoring the imposition of liability, and it may well encourage other
the ensuing litigation would be great, chaos would reign and civilization would stand
still
....
Nevertheles [sic], liability has been imposed in accordance with elementary
rules of justice and the moral code, and civilization in consequence, has not been
bankrupted, nor have the courts been inundated with confusion." Id. at 884.
37. Id. 884, 885.
38. Id. at 885.
39. Ibid. These judges support the conclusion of liability only because active misfeasance was alleged. They were unwilling to support liability in the case of negligent

nonfeasance.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 885-87.
42. Supra note 1.
43. The negligence with which the water company is charged has, in a few cases,
been clearly misfeasance. See, e.g., Cole v. Arizona Edison Co., 53 Ariz. 141, 86 P.2d
946 (1939) (lines not kept free of "weeds, vegetation and other foreign substances");
Anderson v. Iron Mountain Water Works, 225 Mich. 574, 196 N.W. 357 (1923)
(water hydrants "frozen and useless"). However, the overwhelming majority of
decisions have considered complaints in which the negligence charged is a failure to
provide sufficient water under sufficient pressure. Heretofore, the character of the
water company's negligence has not been considered material.

1560

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 17

jurisdictions to reconsider an area of the law which has been considered "well-settled" for nearly half a century.44 The theory that a
supplier of products or services may have imposed upon him duties
of care to an ultimate consumer not in privity of contract is being
applied in an expanding variety of factual contexts, 45 and to impose
such an obligation upon water companies would not be inconsistent
with this trend. Several theories for tort liability have commended
themselves as proper reasons for holding a water company liable for
negligently failing to provide water to fire hydrants as it has contracted to do. A party who negligently cuts off the source of water
at a critical time has been held answerable in damages to a property
owner injured by this "negligence.46 The water company which
negligently fails to provide water may reasonably be considered
equally misfeasant in preventing the taxpayer or the municipality
from procuring a reliable source of protection. Also, the water company, by establishing its water system and placing fire hydrants in
proximity to valuable property, has represented that it is able to
provide water should a fire erupt and has induced the community to
rely completely upon its ability to do so. 47 These theories supporting
the position of liability for the water company reflect a sound policy
of public responsibility. When a water company fails to provide
water to fight a fire, it fails in the very function for which it was
established and for which it is compensated by the taxpayers. The
water company also fails to do what it alone is able to do by virtue
of its monopolistic position. A company unable or unwilling to bear
the "burden" of its negligence in providing the service it has chosen
to produce for the public may reasonably be called upon to retire
from "its public service."
44. See, e.g., Anderson v. Iron Mountain Water Works, supra note 40, at 576, 196
N.W. 357, wherein the Supreme Court of Michigan considering the question for the
first time summarily concluded: "The question, while of first impression in this state,
has been so often decided adversely to plaintiff in the federal courts, in other states,
and in England and Canada, as to render an extended opinion on the subject
supererogatory."
45. Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
46. See, e.g., Gilbert v. New Mexico Construction Co., 39 N.M. 216, 44 P.2d 489
(1935), in which a construction company which had negligently broken a watermain
was held liable to a homeowner because it had deprived the homeowner of the assistance of the fire department in quenching a fire.
47. Corbin, supra note 14, at 439.
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Unfair Competition-Extent to Which State Law
of Unfair Competition May Prohibit
Imitation of Commercial Product Designs
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions go far toward
clarifying the hitherto unanswered question of how far states may
go in prohibiting product imitation of unpatented articles. In each
case an action was brought in federal district court' for infringement
of patents and for unfair competition. In the first case the defendant
marketed a nearly exact copy of a floor-to-ceiling pole lamp on which
plaintiff held design and mechanical patents. In the second case
defendant copied a flourescent lighting fixture on which plaintiff
had secured a design patent. In each instance the lower court held
these patents invalid but nevertheless enjoined the defendants from
further imitation on the grounds that they were engaged in unfair
competition.2 The court of appeals affirmed in each case, 3 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4 Held, reversed. When an article
is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid
others to copy that article. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964). Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.

234 (1964).
Traditionally the law of unfair competition has been invoked to
prevent "passing off" or "palming off" one person's goods as those
of another.5 The objective of the law of unfair competition is the
prevention of consumer confusion 6--an objective vastly different from
that of the federal patent laws, which is to protect the originator of
a design. However, in many instances, the effect of the law of unfair
competition has been to give protection similar to that available
under a patent. The relief granted to plaintiffs has usually been an
injunction which prevents the copying of the article, not merely an
order to defendant to identify his own product so as to distinguish
1. Jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958), which allows federal courts
to hear unfair competition claims when "joined with a substantial and related claim
under the copyright, patent or trade-mark laws."
2. The federal courts must apply local law to claims of unfair competition. Pecheur
Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942).
3. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963). Day-Brite
Lighting Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
4. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 374 U.S. 826 (1963). Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 374 U.S. 825 (1963).
No review was sought of the ruling affirming the district court's holding that the
patents were invalid. 376 U.S. 225, 227 n.1; 376 U.S. 234, 236, n.2.
5. See 1 Nnvis, UN-.m CoMPETIION AND ThADE-MAmcu's § 9a (4th ed. 1947).
6. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917); Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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it from that of plaintiff's.7 The problem of consumer confusion seems
to have arisen first in trade name and trade-mark cases, where the
question is whether the buying public associated the name or mark

with a single source and bought the product due to their belief that
it came from that source.8 This idea of unfair competition was extended to product imitation on the theory that just as with trade
marks, so may a particular feature of a product have acquired secondary meaning-that is, a capacity for identifying its source to the
consumer 9 There is something of a split among the cases as to
whether in order to make out a case of unfair competition the first
producer must meet the strict requirements of secondary meaning, 10

or whether a showing of the mere likelihood of confusion is sufficient."
Although subject to increasing criticism 12 and to a number of adverse
holdings,'13 the view that secondary meaning must be conclusively
established seems to be supported by the majority of cases. 14 In

applying the law of unfair competition to cases of product simulation, courts have also distinguished between functional 15 and non7. Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957); Flint. v. Oleet Jewelry
Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Cf. relief given in the lower courts
in the instant cases. 313 F.2d 115; 311 F.2d 26.
8. 1 Nms, op. cit. supra note 5, § 37.
9. Upjohn Co. v. William S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1920);
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., supranote 6.
Learned Hand, in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., set down the strict
requirements necessary for finding secondary meaning: (1) The plaintiff must "show
that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to mean that some particular person
-the plaintiff may not be individually known-makes them, and that the public cares
who does make them .... ." (2) "[The public is moved . . . to buy the article
because of its source." 247 F.2d at 300.
10. Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H. G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1962);
American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960); Crescent Tool Co.
v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., supra note 6; Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc.,
supra note 6.
11. McGill Mfg. Co. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 43 F.2d 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); Rushmore
v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1908); Flint v. Oleet
Jewelry Mfg. Co., supra note 7; Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d
271 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
12. See Galbally, Unfair Trade in the Simulation of Rival Goods-The Test of
Commercial Necessity, 3 VILL. L. REv. 333 (1958). See also Pollack, Unfair Trading
by Product Simulation: Rule or Rankle?, 23 OMo ST. L.J. 74, 86 (1962), who suggests
that the so-called minority view as to secondary meaning-that simulation will be
enjoined if the copying of non-functional features is merely likely to deceive consumers
-is simply a procedural variation of the majority rule: "[A] study makes it apparent
that secondary meaning, which is presupposed, is not eliminated as an essential
element under the ... [minority] doctrine, but merely that proof of secondary meaning
is excluded."
13. Cases cited note 11 supra.
14. Cases cited note 10 supra.
15. "Functional features include not only those which lend utility and efficiendy
to the articles but also those which contribute to its appearance, or may affect the
cost of production." 1 Nns, op. cit. supra note 5, § 134, at 375. See also, Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122, rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 674 (1938);
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functional 16 features of an article;' 7 and the general rule has been
that only non-functional elements of the design will be protected
against an infringing copy. 18 Essentially, then, the status of authority
in this area has been that non-functional elements which have
achieved secondary meaning will be protected against copying.
In reversing the court of appeals, 19 the Supreme Court noted that
provision for a federal patent law was made one of the enumerated
powers of Congress by the Constitution, and that ever since the
ratification of the Constitution Congress has fixed the conditions upon
which patents and copyrights may be granted.20 The Court went on
to point out that it is well established that the federal law may not
be encroached upon by a state law.21 Furthermore, just as a state
cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, by extending
the life of a federal patent beyond its expiration date, neither can it
do so indirectly by some other method, such as the use of the law of
unfair competition. To permit a state to do so would be to allow it
to grant "protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the
federal patent laws." 22 When a federal patent expires the monopoly
created by it also expires, and the right to make the article in exactly
the shape it carried when patented passes into the public domain. So
also to the public belongs the right precisely to duplicate any article
which for any reason is unpatentable. To hold otherwise, said the
Court, would mean that while federal law grants only fourteen or
seventeen years' protection under the patent laws, the states could
grant perpetual protection to articles which were not sufficiently novel
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., supra note 6. On the other hand, Lektro-Shave

Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 92 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1937), defines functional features as those which, in an engineering sense, are essential to the construction of a
commodity. For other "strict" definitions of "functional" see also, Haeger Potteries,
Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D. Cal. 1954); McGill Mfg. Co. v.
Leviton Mfg. Co., supra note 11.
16. A non-functional feature is described as "a mere arbitrary embellishment" on
the product which may serve to identify its source. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,
198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.,
supra note 6.
17. This distinction finds its basis in the belief that a second comer should be able
to duplicate unpatented features of an article which lend utility and efficiency to the
article. On the other hand, to allow copying of mere arbitrary embellishments which
serve no useful function would be to contribute greatly to consumer confusion. Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., supra note 6; Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Waldman, 69 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
18. American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, supra note 10; West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp.,
105 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., supra note
6; Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., supra note 6.
19. 376 U.S. 225 (1964); 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
20. 376 U.S. at 229.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 231.
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to merit any patent at all under federal law and the Constitution.2 3

Such an encroachment is too great to be tolerated.24 However, the
Court went on to point out that a state may require that goods be

labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source of the articles.2

In holding there cannot be actionable unfair competition from the
copying of an unpatented article, 26 the Court has rejected the idea

that the law of unfair competition may be utilized by the states to
set up a sort of common law patent.27 It has not, however, eliminated the law of unfair competition or even eliminated the states from
the field of unfair competition. To the contrary, all that the Court
has done is to restrict the doctrine of unfair competition to its original
objective-the prevention of consumer confusion. The Court has in
fact indicated, in the form of dictum, how far states may go in protecting a manufacturer against product imitation: They may require
proper labeling and advertising of the product in order to prevent

the consumer from being misled as to its source; they may not enjoin
the imitation itself.28 It should be noted that possibly the main
reason that the law of unfair competition had been extended to the
point of granting common law patents was the failure of the federal
patent laws to grant adequate protection against product imitation.

Now that whatever protection the states felt justified in giving to
a first comer has been largely swept away, there is an even larger

void in the amount of protection one may secure for an original
product or design. As a result, assuming that federal common law

will not be applied,2 9 the demands of the public for an extension
of the patent laws to fill this void may be expected to increase.

23. Id. at 232.
24. ibid.
25. 376 U.S. at 232; 376 U.S. at 238.
26. 376 U.S. at 232-33; 376 U.S. at 238.
27. In holding that a state may not enjoin the copying of an unpatented article, the
Court seems likely to have also foreclosed the possibility of obtaining such relief
under federal common law. Prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
the attitude of the federal courts in cases of product imitation was that by creating
property rights in articles which are within the scope of the patents and copyrights
clause of the Constitution, they would be infringing on an area reserved to Congress
by the Constitution. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
However, since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins state law has been applied in such cases. Ettore
v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956). The above
federal common law view on this subject is therefore no longer followed. In light
of the holdings in Sears and Compco, however, there is a possibility that an action
might be brought on the basis of federal common law in hopes that states having been
prohibited frorf granting common law patents, the federal courts might take up the
task. It seems highly unlikely that they will do so, see Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,
s-upra, and we may surmise that there will be no such thing as a common law patent,
in either state or federal courts.
28. 376 U.S. at 232-33; 376 U.S. at 238.
29. See note 27 supra.

